What Needs to Change in UN Peace Operations?

An expert briefing book prepared for the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

November 2014

Foreword

At the beginning of November, immediately after the announcement of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and International Peace Institute (IPI) asked a broad group of independent experts, think-tanks and civil society organizations to submit short notes on potential priorities for the panel. In less than a fortnight, we received sixty contributions from 20 different countries.

We have gathered these submissions in the pages that follow, roughly divided into fifteen thematic sections. The contributions vary considerably in approach: some focus on a single priority in depth, while others address a series of issues more briefly. Almost all contributors have made recommendations for the Panel, but these range from broad strategic points to specific technical ideas.

We have edited the contributions only minimally. The authors write in *a personal capacity* except in a few cases where organizations chose to make institutional submissions. We hope that by bringing these submissions together we can offer the Panel members a rapid introduction to some of the major concerns and debates among experts on peace operations, and that the Panel will want to follow up on many of the ideas presented here. However, because this briefing book came together quickly, we make no pretense that the selection of topics, ideas and recommendations it contains is either scientific or definitive.

That said, this collection does give a sense of certain keys issues in current expert debates on peace operations, ranging from strategic questions over the role of the UN in peace enforcement, stabilization and peacebuilding to operational priorities such as the protection of civilians and institutional concerns such as the quality of mission leadership. We imagine that individual panel members will turn to the thematic sections of greatest relevance to their own experience and priorities – a full index of the topics raised in the briefing book can be found at the end of the publication – but we hope that they will also recognize that the variety and range of submissions indicates that there is both *(1)* real demand for change in the peace operations system, and *(2)* the basic answer to the question in our title ("What needs to change?") is "a lot." We hope that this collection of pieces will help the Panel form its own views on what needs to change the most. We would like to thank Lamii Kromah and Michael R. Snyder for a huge amount of work in bringing this briefing book together over a very short period of time.

Richard Gowan
Center on International Cooperation

Adam C. Smith
International Peace Institute

Table of Contents

Thierry Tardy, EU Institute for Security Studies
Philipp Rotmann, Global Public Policy Institute
Mateja Peter, NUPI
Max Kelly, National Defense University

Tor Tanke Holm & Mark Downes, DCAF
World Vision International

Alexandra Novosseloff, Centre Thucydide, Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas
Patrice Sartre
Lisa Sharland, Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Alan Ryan, Australian Civil-Military Centre
Manuel Fröhlich, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Annika Hilding Norberg, FBA
Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

Bethan Greener, Massey University
Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, UiT The Arctic University of Norway

Rosa Freedman, University of Birmingham
Ray Murphy, National University of Ireland Galway
Gëzim Visoka, Dublin City University
Transparency International UK

Jaïr van der Lijn & Xenia Avezov
Janja Vuga, University of Ljubljana
Kai Michael Kenkel, University of Rio de Janeiro

John Karlsrud, NUPI
Bill Flavin, US Army War College
Jocelyn Coulon & Michel Liégeois, ROP
David Curran, Coventry University
International Security Sector Advisory Team, DCAF
William G. O'Neill, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum

Creating and Keeping the Peace is the Future of Peacekeeping in Africa

There is no peace to keep in contemporary violent conflict environments because terrorists, criminal gangs, traffickers, and unfriendly militias deliberately target the civilian population as well as peacekeepers, especially in Africa's crises. As a result, the continued relevance of UN peacekeeping in Africa must be predicated on three main reform elements.

First, the UN must accommodate, in concrete terms, the idea of strategic and operational partnerships with regional institutions within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In this regard, the strengths of regional institutions as first and rapid responders to African crises must be acknowledged, supported, and strengthened. Through such collaboration, and based on lessons learned from recent transitions of authorities from AU peace support operations to UN peacekeeping missions in Mali and Central African Republic, this would create conditions for the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions with stabilization rather than an offensive mandate.

Second, there is a need for a thorough rethink of UN benchmarks for deploying and liquidating UN peacekeeping. In the absence of peace agreements, weak governance and security institutions of the host state, and unending risks of asymmetrical warfare, what "new" indicators will define the character, mandate, deployment, and exit strategy of peacekeeping? Perhaps the UN should adopt a more flexible conceptualization of peacekeeping defined not in terms of keeping the peace but rather in terms of peace consolidation that primarily consists of a protection of civilians mandate concomitantly linked to the building of more effective governance, security, justice, reconciliation and public institutions as part of its pre-defined exit strategy.

Finally, the provision of support to a non-UN entity for the purposes of conducting offensive operations prior to the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations may no longer be considered as an exception but a practical necessity in some future peace operations if the UN is to remain a critical actor even before the deployment of blue helmets in a particular context. The current support being provided to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by the UN Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA) should be considered as an exemplary model (and enhanced by aligning UN administrative guidelines and procedures to offensive operations) for ensuring that the UN is an integral part of a non-UN operation, prior to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation.

Jide Martyns Okeke, PhD
Peace and Security Department, African Union Commission

African Missions Transitions to UN Missions: Mali

The experiences between the AU/ECOWAS and the UN in the context of AFISMA leading up to the transition to MINUSMA were quite instructive for our understanding of the challenges and opportunities for future peace operations partnerships between the UN and the Regional Organisations. Such partnerships will likely remain a sine qua non for the management and resolution of conflict particularly on the African continent. The transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA provided a strong demonstration of the strengthening of the strategic partnership between the UN and the AU/ECOWAS. It goes without saying that there is an interest on all sides in cooperation and burden sharing for peace operations in Africa and in this regard, ways and means of increasing efficacy and efficiency will always be a key priority.

Getting the partnerships or relationships right at the political-strategic, institutional and operational levels is important if we are to increase our chances for success in the field. Cooperation needs certainly to be less ad-hoc and better structured. Increased communication, transparency, visibility and understanding of each other's working procedures and methods, decision making processes and so forth will go a long way towards ameliorating tensions and promoting understanding. Political considerations will always be primary but practical cooperation can foster mutual understanding by the respective organizations of the situation on the ground and can support coordination of action prior to decisions being taken at the political strategic level. As such, a key priority area for the Panel's consideration should be focused on a reassessment of the UN's engagement with Regional Organizations in the conduct of peace operations.

In this context, the Panel would do well to come up with specific recommendations pertaining to deepening the strategic dialogue between the UN and Regional Organisations as well as identifying concrete opportunities for joint planning at both the strategic and operational levels of engagement. Lastly, funding, logistical and other constraints on the part of Regional Organisations such as the AU often call into question their ability to become truly equal or effective partners in the maintenance of peace and security. However, when the AU (and its sub-regional organisations) engage in peace operations, they ultimately do so on behalf of the international community and their efforts go a long way towards establishing the necessary preconditions for that wider engagement by the international community. AMISOM provides a good case in point. The UN is thus obligated to a great extent to find ways in which to support and bolster the efforts of its regional partners and more predictable but flexible partnership models should be sought and negotiated at the highest political levels.

Yvonne Akpasom
AU Peace Support Operations Division Advisor on Secondment to the Directorate of
Peacekeeping and Regional Security of the ECOWAS Commission

Partnerships and Regional Organizations

Cooperation with the AU and Other Regional Partners

One of the issues the Panel will have to address is the relationship between the UN and regional partners, and in this context the most critical relationship is that between the UN and the African Union (AU).

Approximately 70% of the UN's SPMs and PKOs are deployed in Africa. All the AU operations to date, with the exception of AMISOM, have been re-hatted into UN peacekeeping missions, and the UN has provided some form of support to all the AU operations.

Africans make up approximately 50-60% of the UN's international civilian peace operations staff and about 80% of its local staff. Africa also contributes approximately 40% of the UN's uniformed peacekeepers. African capacities are thus an important resource for UN peacekeeping, and UN support is a critical enabler for AU operations. The effectiveness of both the UN and the AU are thus mutually interdependent on many levels.

However, this strategically important relationship is under strain. The UN narrative is often that it needs to come to the rescue of poorly equipped and badly managed AU operations. In contrast, the AU perspective is that its missions have significantly contributed to creating the conditions that have made it possible for UN follow-up missions to deploy. Thus, instead of a relationship based on partnership and complementarity, it has become characterized by tensions and competition.

The Panel will need to consider what can be done to foster a common narrative that is mutually re-enforcing and respectful of each other's roles. The UN and AU should develop a common doctrine on transitions that clarifies the strategic division of tasks – stabilization by the AU followed by UN peacekeeping – based on their respective comparative advantages. Perhaps some kind of UN-AU fusion cell is needed that can manage UN-AU relations, including transitions, in a manner that recognizes the strategic importance and inter-dependency of the relationship.

Cedric de Coning
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

Partnerships and Regional Organizations

Observations and Suggestions from Russian Experts in Connection with the UN Review of Peace Operations

1. Advancement of the UN-mandated peace operations is possible through **broader involvement of pre-formed and pre-trained contingents of regional organizations**. Today's complex emergencies demand heavier application of force and heavier weaponry, rapid deployment, use of satellite images and drones. The old method of creating *ad hoc* "straw-by-straw" coalitions from soldiers of many countries should be substituted (at least in most difficult cases) by delegating operations to jointly *pre-trained crises response forces* of regional organizations, the legal basis would be covered by the UN Charter specifically Chapter VIII.

Precedents are set by hybrid operations between the UN and AU, as well as UN and ECOWAS in Africa, by delegating authority to the EU in its non-European operations and by transferring actual command and coordination to NATO since 2003 in UN-mandated coalition operation in Afghanistan.

But there are more opportunities for regional organizations to be involved in the implementation of UN mandates. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) unites 6 post-Soviet countries. Its Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPF) consists of 3600 military personnel with relevant weaponry, equipment and autonomous transporting capabilities (planes, helicopters). CPF has a reserve peacekeeping capacity of 17,000 troops which are the Collective Forces for Operational Reaction (CORF). The basis of deploying under UN auspices was approved at the summit level, this allows for CSTO forces to be deployed in Africa, Asia or the Middle East.

Other possible candidates are the League of Arab States, Organization of Islamic Cooperation and interconnected sub-regional organizations. They demonstrated their ability to operate in "UN mode" when in 2011-2012 they formed and sent to Syria military observers (116 observers from 13 Arab countries and 6 sub-regional Middle East and African organizations led by a Sudanese general). The Mission operated in 20 regions of Syria, though unfortunately it didn't appropriately coordinate and share information with the UN. But knowledge of the local language and culture made a huge impact and that's the value added these organizations can bring.

2. We should consider **creating a Council of Regional Organizations** aimed at coordinating the actions of regional organizations in crises response. There should be regular coordination meetings between the Secretaries-General of UN, OSCE, NATO, CSTO, AU, LAS, etc., especially in case of multidimensional crises.

3. The development of a strategic policy and guidance concept for future **force intervention brigades**. Modern conflicts require the UN to use coercive and forceful tactics against armed

groups and militias not reconciled to peace processes. The involvement of the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC under the UN mandate started while political agreement between major UN states (even the P5 states) regarding its mandate, formats and limits has yet to be formalized. Thus special inter-state and inter-agency consultations are needed to clarify the status and limitations of this new component of UN operations.

Prof. Alexander Nikitin, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security
Moscow State Institute for International Relations under the Russian MFA

Partnerships and Regional Organizations

Partnerships and Fragile States

The UN does not lack harsh critics, but even they acknowledge two singular contributions of using the military to enhance international security: operationally, peacekeeping; and normatively, the responsibility to protect (R2P). The evolution of the former away from consent and minimal use of force still falls far short of R2P's coercive requirements. As the vast majority of UN operations respond to humanitarian catastrophes or have significant humanitarian dimensions, answers to three questions circumscribe the potential for reforms not only before the end of the current secretary-general's term but also in the medium-term.

First, will the United Nations remain incapable of humanitarian intervention? While imminently capable of deploying peacekeeping operations, the UN is no longer in the enforcement business as reflected in the 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* and the 2000 Brahimi report. Financial, logistic, and intelligence shortcomings have resulted in the UN's relying upon such regional organizations as the AU, EU, and NATO. Subcontracting to regional organizations and coalitions of the willing may be inevitable; but it eventually haunts the UN, which invariably returns after Chapter VII interventions when post-conflict peace-building plays to the world organization's strengths. At that point, the UN is left to pick up the pieces from a military operation not under its control accompanied by a messy non-division of labor with re-hatted soldiers and hybrid procedures.

Second, can the West continue as "missing in action" from UN peace operations, now a Third World ghetto? The demand for peacekeepers remains high, but the September 2014 NATO summit paid no attention as pressing preoccupations—Russia's shenanigans and ISIL—predominated. Despite US pressures on allies for more military spending, any increases will not benefit the UN but NATO and the EU. Meanwhile, with Africa as the main theater for peace operations, the AU and sub-regional groups will initiate enforcement, which will invariably require Western help to finance, equip, and transport the troops. In both moral and operational terms, the continuation of this approach is problematic.

Third, should the UN concentrate on conflict-prone and fragile states? As middle-income countries and emerging economies progress and the UN development system becomes marginal, the organization should cease to have an operational presence in all developing countries and focus on fifty or so conflict-prone and fragile states. But its fitness for purpose for this comparative advantage is anything except obvious because of the system's atomization and decentralized scramble for resources.

Prof. Thomas G. Weiss
The Graduate Center, The City University of New York

Partnerships and Regional Organizations

Inputs for the UN High-Level Panel on Peace Operations

The Panel should revisit the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter regulating the relations between the UN and regional organizations to strengthen peace operations in the future. This is nowhere more pronounced than in relation to peace operations in Africa, where contributions by African states to both UN and non-UN peace operations have grown dramatically over the course of the past decade. Presently, approximately 70% of the UN's missions are deployed on the African continent, and African nations contribute approximately 40% of the UN's uniformed peacekeepers. The growth in contributions from African countries has been dramatic, increasing from little over 10,000 uniformed personnel per annum in 2003 to 35,000 uniformed per annum in 2013. In addition to contributions to UN operations, African countries have also increasingly contributed to peace operations undertaken by the AU or sub-regional organizations. In 2013, for instance, over 40,000 uniformed and civilian personnel were mandated to serve in African peace support operations, excluding the hybrid UNAMID mission.

While collaboration between the UN and regional organizations is evolving, focused attention needs to be paid to four particular areas of engagement to attain better outcomes. First, the concept of subsidiarity needs to be expanded on. The UN engages with a wide range of regional and sub-regional organizations, and concepts of authority, channels of communication, and levels of responsibility are not clear to all the actors involved. Second, strengthening joint planning and information-sharing is key. While outcomes cannot be predicted in advance, and responses must be tailored to a specific context and capabilities leveraged accordingly in response, the manner in which outcomes are attained can be made more predictable. Understanding how each organization works, sharing the right information at the right time and at the right level, and undertaking joint planning where possible serves to strengthen outcomes. Third, the UN should enter into structured dialogue with regional organizations on the provision of support, be this financial, logistical or other, so that when joint action is required, a shared understanding of what can be expected, and the commensurate responsibilities, already exists between all the relevant actors. Fourth, engagement with TCCs and PCCs should be better structured, especially in instances where these are contributing to both UN and non-UN peace operations. TCCs and PCCs are both a limited and common resource, and in instances where these are deploying to both UN and non-UN operations, or are being re-hatted from one into another, common and clear engagement is of importance, for both political and operational reasons.

Walter Lotze
Advisor with the Peace Support Operations Division of the African Union Commission,
currently on secondment to the African Union Mission in Somalia.

Partnerships and Regional Organizations

Cooperation between TCCs and the UN; South Asia cooperation; peacebuilding and NGOs

First, it is crucial for all relevant stakeholders to understand that the nature of peacekeeping under the auspices of the United Nations is expanding and currently requires robust mandates, such as the use of force under chapter VII and interventions in challenging environments. It is quite likely that the robustness of future peacekeeping will exact a heavy load as far as the capabilities and will of TCCs and PCCs are concerned. Unfortunately, there exists a knowledge gap between TCCs/PCCs and the United Nations as they seek to address the upcoming challenges. Such a gap comprises the strenuous nature of the missions, complex geo-political settings of the mission, non-familiarity of the TCCs/PCCs with these complexities and similar issues. The UN may like to invest more resources in generating knowledge regarding the future challenges and in training the potential actors to minimize risks for peacekeeping ventures.

Second, the United Nations has long been benefitted from regional enterprises in its peacekeeping endeavors. We believe that South Asia has unique capabilities to contribute in UN peacekeeping issues. However, the current regional framework in South Asia does not necessarily lead towards an African model in spite of the tremendous potential. Provided the experience that the individual South Asian nations have in generating force and other resources in peacekeeping missions, a combined regional effort would be a benefit multiplier for the UN in various capacities. We believe it is high time for the UN to facilitate a custom-made framework of regional cooperation among South Asian top-contributors to attain the broad vision of the UN peacekeeping missions. This may require the UN to facilitate constructive engagement of the policymakers of these nations so that they can come with a feasible plan of regional approach that adds value into the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.

Third, peacebuilding strikes a chord of another critical need: the engagement of non-state actors that provide services—health, education, sanitation, disaster management, build institutions, and others—to a conflict affected country. The UN may consider upping its reliance on the NGOs to meet such increasing demands in the days ahead. There is a large number of NGOs who have tremendous capabilities to provide services and contribute to UN peacebuilding efforts in various capacities. For example, BRAC, a Bangladeshi NGO, has earned unparalleled reputation as the largest NGO in the world and has established its vibrant presence from Africa to Afghanistan in providing services on various issues ranging from health to economic development of communities. Therefore, it is essential for UN to formalize these efforts from NGOs on a much broader scale and create more opportunities so that they can productively engage in UN's peacebuilding missions from an early stage of UN's involvement.

Dr. Rashed Uz Zaman & Niloy Ranjan Biswas
Department of International Relations
University of Dhaka

Protection of Civilians

Civilian Protection and Harm Mitigation Policies, Practices, and Tools

As UN Peace Operations take an increasingly offensive posture there is a growing ethical and strategic imperative for the development and standardization of civilian harm mitigation policies, practices, and tools aimed at both preventing and responding to civilian harm. UN Peace Operations are more complex and robust than ever with mandates ranging from protecting civilian populations and preventing ethnic conflict to stabilization operations and facing down anti-government and extremist groups. With two-thirds of all peacekeepers now in active conflict zones, there may be an increased need to use force to protect both civilians and themselves from direct attacks. To ensure peacekeepers have the tools they need, the current review of UN Peace Operations should prioritize the development of civilian harm mitigation (CHM) policy and practice, including:

- Insertion of key language in any UN mandate on: "[the need to] mitigate risk before, during, and after any military operation."[1] Ideally, offensive mandates should also include language on appointing a Civilian Risk Mitigation Advisor (CRMA) who reports directly to the Force Commander. If appropriate for a mission, a Civilian Harm Tracking Cell should be created to track and analyze data on civilian harm and support implementation, oversight, and communication of civilian harm mitigation efforts including response to alleged incidents.

- Wherever appropriate and feasible, civilian harm mitigation practices should engage <u>all</u> warring parties in:
  - *Pre-conflict planning and training*: Consideration of how to mitigate harm should be included in the earliest stages of military and civilian planning for peace operations, including in mission assessments, concept of operations, and budgeting.
  - *Civilian harm tracking and analysis*: Peacekeepers should systematically gather and analyze data about their operations including effects on the civilian population to inform military leadership on tactics and training needed to lessen civilian harm in future operations.
  - *Amends for civilian harm*: It is critical for missions to recognize any incidental civilian harm through the making of amends (recognition and assistance for harm within the lawful parameters of combat operations).

Combined, these efforts can contribute to the preservation of human dignity and the healing of a post-conflict society, while also helping stakeholders to directly address grievances and temper the spread of violent conflict. There are now precedents for civilian harm mitigation in AU (AMISOM) and UN (MINUSMA) missions, which can be further developed and tailored for other operational environments.

Center for Civilians in Conflict

---

[1] Similar language was included in MONUSCO's most recent mandate: UNSCR 2098 para 12(b).

Protection of Civilians

Preparing Peacekeepers to Prevent Mass Atrocities

Peacekeepers are increasingly called upon to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. UN peacekeeping operations have historically struggled to protect civilians from these crimes; the failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica were defining moments that led to inclusion of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the World Summit Outcome Document of September 2005 and its subsequent adoption by all UN Member States.

UN peacekeepers play a critical role in the implementation of R2P in country-specific situations. They are called upon to assist states in upholding their primary protection responsibilities, as UNMISS was mandated to do in South Sudan. And when states are unable to protect their populations, as in the Central African Republic or the Democratic Republic of Congo, or are actively perpetrating atrocities against them, as in Sudan, UN peacekeepers are on the frontlines of protecting civilians from mass atrocity crimes.

Despite this, the problems of yesterday continue to plague UN peacekeeping operations today. As the High-Level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations undertakes its review, significant attention should be paid to how to better prepare UN troops and police to prevent mass atrocity crimes – and to proactively protect civilians when atrocities are threatened or underway.

Pre-deployment training modules should be instituted for UN personnel to provide them with a baseline understanding of early warning indicators of mass atrocity crimes, as well as strategies and tactics to contribute to holistic preventive efforts. Scenario-based modules, which can be drawn from a dearth of examples from past experiences, would enhance their ability to assess and respond to situations where civilians are at risk. A recent training course held at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in conjunction with the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the Government of Denmark can serve as a benchmark example in this regard. The new Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect should also be utilized.

Resource mobilization and strengthening rapid deployment capabilities are critical issues that must be addressed to make UN peacekeeping operations more effective. But absent specific training to better prepare peacekeepers to prevent mass atrocity crimes, the UN will continue to deploy troops and police that are ill-equipped to uphold the Responsibility to Protect – with civilians they are charged with protecting paying the ultimate price.

Dr. Simon Adams
Executive Director
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

Protection of Civilians

The utility of military force to protect civilians in UN peace operations

The challenge: Although protection of civilians continues to be the highest priority in UN peace operations, it is still unclear how military force can and should be used to increase its utility to protect. Successful protection operations rely on a different logic than traditional warfare and peacekeeping. Military forces are primarily trained to fight an enemy directly. In protection operations, however, understanding how and why perpetrators attack a third party – the civilians – is critical to identify the proper military countermeasures. Perpetrators' rationales for attacking civilians vary considerably, ranging from genocidal logic, where killing civilians is an end in itself, to insurgencies where civilian targeting is a means to achieve political influence. To maximize the utility of force to protect, different threats must be met with the appropriate function of military force, ranging from amelioration and containment, via deterrence and coercion, to destruction. In this context, the principle of minimum use of force cannot always be upheld.

The way forward: The bedrock principles of peacekeeping operations should be reformed to enable effective protection of civilians under imminent physical threats. The principle of "minimum use of force" must transform into a principle of "utility of force to protect." Finding utility of force does not necessarily mean using more force; it means using force more wisely. Emerging theories on protection of civilians claim that protectors must *mirror* and *match* the strategic functions of violence employed by the perpetrators. A mapping of 175 protection operations in 12 missions in Africa over the last 15 years finds that many civilians were protected in most cases (70 %) where UN peacekeepers *matched* the perpetrators' violence strategy. Conversely, few civilians were protected when there was a mismatch. Such empirical insights should be used to develop better guidelines on when and how military force can be used to protect civilians more effectively.

Stian Kjeksrud
Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

Protection of Civilians

Protection of Civilians and Raised Expectations

In recent years, the United Nations has made significant advances with respect to the protection of civilians (PoC). Yet in South Sudan, Central African Republic, and elsewhere, these words from the "Brahimi Report" still ring true: "Promising to extend such protection establishes a very high threshold of expectation. The potentially large mismatch between desired objective and resources available to meet it raises the prospect of continuing disappointment."

It is therefore imperative that the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations place PoC at the heart of its analysis. The Panel should identify ways to improve PoC across the entire UN peace operations process – from budgeting to accountability. But crucially, the Panel should also acknowledge that UN missions cannot effectively protect civilians in all situations, and it should identify those settings in which different protection actors should be deployed.

Since the "Brahimi Report," the Security Council has included PoC more consistently in its operational mandates, and the UN system has enhanced its PoC doctrine and training. These changes, bolstered by leadership from certain member-states and individuals, have saved lives. However, key parts of the peace operations system have not made sufficient progress toward supporting PoC. The UN's budget should incentivize troop-contributing countries to not only provide working equipment, but also to protect at-risk populations. Member-states should address the persistent shortfalls in logistics and information-gathering that hinder the UN's response. And the near-total lack of accountability for troops – and troop contributors – for protection failures must be remedied.

Perfecting the UN's approach to PoC is important, yet so is recognizing its limits. The UN cannot be the sole, or even primary, guarantor of protection globally. Too often, the Security Council has tasked the UN with providing protection in environments where that is plainly not feasible. This not only raises the "threshold of expectation" impossibly high, but also allows more suitable protection actors (such as member-states and regional organizations) to evade responsibility. Relatedly, the Council has demonstrated a tendency to confuse peacekeeping with peacemaking, giving UN missions the tools to respond to violence but not the means – or the diplomatic backing – to stop it. These problems must be addressed if peacekeepers are to be successful.

Refugees International hopes that this distinguished Panel can identify ways to improve the UN's PoC performance, while also challenging expectations that the UN cannot hope to meet. We look forward to supporting the Panel as it undertakes these important tasks.

Michel Gabaudan
President, Refugees International

Protection of Civilians

Above all, UN peace operations should focus on providing Protection of Civilians (PoC) that responds to the stated needs and capacities of civilians. Currently, the conception of mandates and the corresponding operational plans are insufficiently based on the needs and capacities of the civilians that are to be protected. It is therefore vital that these missions work together continuously and constructively with local communities and civil society to understand which priorities can and should be addressed; inform civilians what they can and should expect from UN missions in their own locality; and determine how civilians can contribute to security promotion in cooperation with UN missions. From planning to evaluation, PoC missions should base their actions on the needs and capacities of the population to enhance effectiveness and sustainability of protection in the long term.

To this aim, UN peacekeeping missions should:

a) Maximize patrol capacity by assessing the needs and capabilities to peacefully resolve local conflicts and support local "champions of change" like church actors, trusted governance actors, chiefs, and other change agents for peace, and facilitate their work by providing transportation and communication support, allowing access to necessary areas, and assisting with other actions that may be identified by civil society.

b) Communicate in clear terms what they can do practically in the near future for each locality. This should also include how available services of UN missions can be requested, and how civilians can report human rights abuse cases as they happen.

c) Indicate in public reporting a clear and convincing choice for the protection of all civilians, effectively preventing being seen as supporting either side of a conflict or as the protector of national state elites when this is not the case.

d) Regularly gather and analyze information regarding the security of civilians outside UN bases to increase visibility, improve understanding of local security dynamics, and develop appropriate protection strategies and tactics based on this understanding. For this to be effective, structured consultations with local communities are essential.

PAX
The Netherlands

UN Peace Operations: What needs to change?

UNA-UK welcomes the Panel's establishment as a new opportunity to encourage Member States to support a strategic, holistic approach to peace operations that starts and ends with prevention. This has been a recurring theme of reform initiatives, which have recognized the mismatch between traditional operations and current conflict realities. However, political obstacles have led to incremental efforts with partial results.

While these obstacles remain, recent normative and institutional developments have changed the environment for preventive approaches (e.g. R2P, Rights Up Front, Security Council (SC) "horizon scanning," Human Rights Council fact-finding missions). High-level commitment to prevention could ease the path to better implementation of agreed reforms, greater coordination between mechanisms, more active creativity in using existing powers, and higher determination to achieve results.

Approach

Member States must confront the reality that threats to peace increasingly stem from internal troubles which risk affecting fragile neighbors. A preventive approach that is inclusive and sensitive to regional dynamics is not incompatible with Article 2(7) and should be regarded as reinforced by Article 34 and Chapter VIII.

Institutional gaps

Broadly defined, "prevention" could span the spectrum of the UN's work, from the Sustainable Development Goal on peaceful societies to the activities of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). While UNA-UK hopes the Panel will present new ideas, it should also consider ways to address gaps in institutional capacity by enhancing existing tools and processes, such as:

- Better communication between the SC, Geneva-based mechanisms and PBC, including formal referral processes
- A review of the roles and mandates of DPA, DPKO, DFS and the PBC to ensure they are complementary and do not duplicate or ignore preventive activities
- Stronger regional partnerships to support a capability-driven approach, including: greater emergency response capacity (troop, police and civilian), a regional stand-by roster and links between the SC and regional bodies
- An improved geographical spread of peacekeeping resources, including more consistent support by Member States with advanced operational capabilities

Strategy and practice

Protection of Civilians

There is scope for enhanced strategic planning – by both the Secretariat and Member States – and better, more creative use of powers under the Charter. Preventive measures can be based on state requests or consent, as well as on Articles 34 and 99. The Secretary-General's good offices are one example of where a more proactive effort in mediation and public diplomacy could have a positive preventive effect. Additionally, better implementation of agreed tools, such as more frequent and timely use of fact-finding missions or preventive deployment of peacekeepers, would further improve preventive capacity. Better follow-up on previous reforms should be a key priority for any review of peace operations.

Alexandra Buskie
Peace & Security Programmes Officer, UNA-UK

Protection of Civilians

Training and equipment, implementation of PoC, humanitarian law, and Mission transitions

Training and equipment /Conduct and discipline

- UN military and police forces must have adequate training, resources, and knowledge of the relevant legal norms in order to effectively perform the tasks assigned to them. IHL and other applicable bodies of law - such as human rights law - must be properly integrated into their doctrine, education, training and practices.
- The lack of training, equipment and supervision to perform Protection of Civilian task may lead to a persistent pattern of IHL violations or important collateral damages when peacekeepers are engaged into combat operations. Therefore, when a UNPO mandate includes a PoC task, DPKO should ensure that the troops/forces/peacekeepers are trained, equipped, and ready to fully implement this aspect of their purpose/mandate.
- Misconduct involving TCC personnel harms the aim and the nature of the UNPKO missions, and constitutes a major issue today. There is a need to improve the conduct and the discipline of the TCCs. Activities of prevention, as well as remedial actions (transparent investigation and disciplinary measures, for example) have to move forward.

Implementation of the Protection of Civilian (PoC) task in UNPOs

- **On overbroad mandates,** the UNSC would need to define clear, concise and achievable mandates. Better sequencing of the different types of activities of the peacekeeping mission may perhaps improve the mission's overall effectiveness.
- A review of the UN approach towards PoC may be necessary to reflect on differentiated measures to perform PoC tasks other than **"intervening with force when civilians are under attack"** as the OIOS evaluation pointed out that **"there is a persistent pattern of peacekeeping operations not intervening with force when civilians are under attack."** Such measures could include "ensuring more regular presence, more engagement, deploying forces when tension goes up etc...
- Need to implement PoC strategies in close consultation with other Humanitarian organizations involved in PoC tasks to avoid confusion and create synergy (mention ICRC professional standards for protection work, chapter 3).

Detention operations

- Missions should be well prepared for detention, as the mandate assigned to peacekeepers may include or lead to detention operations. In particular, "robust" mandates increase the likelihood of UN peacekeepers being called upon to deprive persons from their liberty. This requires a clear regulatory framework adapted to the

specificities of the mission, as well as staff, administrative, logistics and financial preparations and means.

The applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL/IHRL) to UN forces

- UN Peacekeeping stakeholders (UNSC, DPKO, TCC etc) should agree on how, when and under which conditions IHL applies to UN forces, and reflect on the consequences derived from the applicability and application of IHL to the personnel of the mission concerned. IHL applicability **and application** should be reflected in operational documents such as directives or RoEs informing the actions carried by a UN mission having become party to an armed conflict.
- The UN & TCCs should put in place measures aimed at ensuring the promotion, dissemination and knowledge of the 1999 UNSG bulletin that addresses IHL application to UN forces.
- UN peacekeepers - troops and police alike - **involved in armed conflict** should be able to **distinguish between law enforcement and combat** in the course of their mission. In this regard, UN personnel involved in law enforcement operations should be made fully aware of and adhere scrupulously to the rules and standards applicable to these situations, in particular human rights law. **It is important to note that IHL does not regulate law enforcement tasks carried by UN peacekeepers.**

Transition from AU to UN mission

- When undertaking the process of transitioning to a UN DPKO mission, DPKO should ensure the appropriate training on mission ROEs, SOPs and equipment is done for AU TCCs so that they are compliant with UN standards – Thus, proper training of AU-MISCA contingents, some of which accused of grave violations of IHL , would have facilitated the transition from MISCA to MINUSCA.
- **Human Rights Due Diligence Policy** HR DDP, as conceived, is a tool for outreach and engagement on respect for IHL and human rights when UNPOs support or work with non-UN security forces (national (FARDC) or regional (AMISOM)). However, the HR DDP should not be only used for an engagement with non UN forces in a reactive mode to avoid responsibility resulting from possible violations of IHL or HR by non-UN forces; But HR DDP should also be used as a tool to ensure a better protection of civilians by reflecting on remedial measures for a more robust and energetic engagement to the HR DDP that would lead to decreased HR and IHL violations by non UN forces supported by UNPOs. »

Integrated Missions

Protection of Civilians

- The multidimensional character of peacekeeping has made it necessary to establish "integrated" UN missions aimed at creating greater coherence and efficiency. UN Integrated missions, (however), contain an inherent risk in terms of the blurring of roles and responsibilities between the different components of the mission, the military, the police and the humanitarians, be they UN or not. Local authorities, arms carriers as well as the local population must be able to differentiate between the different roles of integrated UN missions and the distinct humanitarian actors on the ground. In this regard, greater involvement of all UN entities during the conception and planning of an operation in line with the Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) Policy, to define the appropriate level of structural integration, is encouraged.

International Committee of the Red Cross

Financial Issues

Evaluation and reimbursements

Since the establishment of UNTSO in 1948, the UN has dispatched a number of peace operations. Currently, one of the issues facing UN peace operations is a huge difference in the number of dispatched personnel among contributing states. On the one hand, some developing countries, such as ones in South Asia, dispatched nearly 10,000 personnel, including uniformed and non-uniformed, to UN peace operations, mainly in Africa. On the other hand, many European countries prefer participating in operations led by NATO and the EU, except for their participation in UNIFIL in the Middle East. Likewise, several states are eager to dispatch to many UN peace operations as "token" presence.

Arguably, the above issues are caused by one of the main problems surrounding UN peace operations, which is that UN peace operations are too much "flat" and "equal." In fact, this problem deeply de-motivates many diligent peacekeepers. Therefore, the following suggestions should be deeply taken into account:

- An evaluation system for each solider and contributing state should be more thoroughly adopted. My field research in several UN peace operations indicated that the performance and morale of peacekeepers significantly varied among contributing states. It is partly due to the lack of an evaluation system towards the performance of each personnel and contributing state. This evaluation system should be useful for the next recruitment process for UN peace operations.

- The allowances of UN peace operations should not necessarily be completely flat. They should vary, depending on each contributing state's economic scale and price level.

- The UN should set the total maximum number of personnel dispatched to UN peace operations among each contributing state, say, up to 2000-3000 personnel. Likewise, the UN can set the "ideal number of UN peacekeeping personnel" of each contributing state in accordance with that state's military and economic scale. The UN may also announce the ideal ratio of the total number of personnel between UN and non-UN peace operations, say, 50 (UN):50 (non-UN), by a contributing state.

The above first and second suggestions will motivate diligent peacekeepers and contributing states, especially from developed countries. The last suggestions might not be as acceptable to many states, although such suggestions will make UN peace operations better-balanced, and will enhance the quality of UN peace operations on the whole in the long run.

Katsumi Ishizuka
Kyoei University, Japan

Financial Issues

Moving to Unit-Based Reimbursement for Troop Contributing Countries

The success of UN peacekeeping operations depends on the Member States' willingness to make timely contributions of effective military units, i.e. units that have the personnel, equipment, and training to deliver operationally valuable capabilities and that are unrestricted by national caveats. However, the current system for financing UN peace operations offers few incentives for states to make either timely or highly effective troop contributions. This problem can be overcome if the UN moves towards a unit-based reimbursement system for troop-contributing countries, supplemented by a dedicated readiness premium.

In June/July 2014, UN Member States reached an important agreement on a gradual increase of the basic troop cost reimbursement rate paid to troop contributing countries. Yet as the Senior Advisory Group (SAG) report that helped pave the way towards this increase recognized, there is a deeper problem with the UN reimbursement system. It is fundamentally based on a single per capita troop cost reimbursement rate and separate standardized equipment reimbursement rates, and therefore cannot differentiate among troop contributions based on their timeliness or their operational value. Consequently, it offers inadequate financial rewards for states that deploy their troops quickly, furnish operationally crucial units, and/or allow the UN to make maximum use of their military units' capabilities. Indeed, states face financial disincentives to making these contributions: they have to absorb the additional costs of maintaining readiness, of training and equipping highly capable military units, and of maintaining or replacing equipment damaged by sustained and/or risky use.

To begin to address these issues, the SAG report proposed a key enabling capabilities premium for states, a risk premium for individual peacekeepers, and a reimbursement penalty for states whose contingents deploy without promised major equipment. The General Assembly has adopted all three measures, with modifications including a readiness dimension within the key enabling capabilities premium. Yet as the SAG report itself suggests (§91), these are limited and ideally interim measures.

To create adequate financial incentives for states to provide scarce, expensive and operationally crucial units, the UN must move towards reimbursing states for integrated units delivering particular capabilities. The next step could be introducing unit-based reimbursement selectively, focusing on critical enabling capabilities. Only when reimbursement is directly tied to actual capabilities placed at the mission's disposal can rates be calibrated to reflect the UN's operational needs. A separate readiness premium can then offer incentives to have particular capabilities available for rapid UN deployment.

Katharina Coleman
University of British Columbia

Financial Issues

More effective and transparent reimbursement and assessment rates

1. **Reimbursement & Assessment Rates**

There is persistent friction between troop contributing countries and donor countries regarding reimbursement and assessment rates for UN peacekeepers. In recent years, peacekeepers have increasingly been called upon to carry out more complex, multidimensional mandates in more dangerous operating environments. Over the last decade, more than 1,400 peacekeepers have died on mission, representing more than 43% of all peacekeeping fatalities since the first UN mission was deployed in 1948. Given the increased difficulty and risks associated with their work, it is critical that uniformed personnel and TCCs be fairly compensated. At the same time, a small number of countries pay a huge percentage of the peacekeeping budget, which has been the case for years. The current methodology for apportioning peacekeeping expenses has not changed since 2000 and lacks transparency. This scenario contributes to large donors feeling they are paying a greater portion of expenses than is warranted and leading some Member States to call for reductions in payment, which would be particularly problematic given the growing demands within peacekeeping.

Recommendation: Reimbursement rates should be revisited every three years, similar to the way peacekeeping assessment rates are renegotiated every three years. This would give member states the opportunity to regularly evaluate the costs and benefits to UN peacekeepers to see if they are being adequately compensated for their work.

We recommend two changes as part of the upcoming review of UN assessment rates. Although the criteria and elements of the scale of assessments are explained, we call for the UN to share its raw data used in calculations and make available its formula. This will help alleviate concerns that political motivations are affecting rate determinations. The UN should also determine whether the scale of assessments should better reflect the principle of capacity to pay – a key demand of many member states – by, for example, using gross national income data adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).

2. **Greater Transparency**

Future decisions to raise reimbursement rates need to be based on accurate and timely data in order to ensure that such increases are evidence-based. The lack of such data has been decried by major funders of UN peacekeeping and the dearth also makes it difficult to know where gaps exist. With better data, member states would be in position to provide certain assets or technologies that could assist in carrying out mandates. Information on the use of funds must also highlight when countries lack resources due to Member State funding shortfalls. Member States must understand how underfunding missions and/or not paying at their full assessed rate

negatively impact the TCC's ability to adequately resource missions and how it can undermine the overall effectiveness of UN peacekeeping.

Recommendation: TCCs submit to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) a report on how their reimbursement funds are utilized, along with - when relevant - how any shortfalls in member state contributions impact their ability to resource missions.

Better World Campaign
1750 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20006

Financial Issues

Equipment, evaluation, inspections, and reimbursements

The points below touch on peacekeeping performance at the operational and tactical levels as observed with robust mandates like MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) where contingents carry out operations in a "highly mobile and versatile manner" to neutralize armed groups. The future calls for greater flexibility, listening to the individual needs of TCCs, and adequately compensating the individual peacekeeper.

1. **Inspections**

The manner and conduct of operational inspections in the theater needs review. As units are highly mobile and operate in treacherous terrain, there is a possibility of equipment not meeting the required standards (e.g. broken lenses, cracked windscreens, and missing parts). The focus for the men and women on the ground at that time becomes "the mission" and maintaining the initiative against the armed groups.

Reforms needed: Increased flexibility is needed regarding scheduling and focus of such inspections so that they are not in conflict with the tactical situation. After inspection of Troop Contributing Countries' (TCCs) equipment upon arrival, there should be a greater degree of flexibility by the verification and inspection teams regarding operational inspections. That also calls for an upward review of the "intensity of operation" and "environmental conditions" factors to make participation in robust mandates attractive. Otherwise when nations make a proper cost-benefit analysis of participating in robust mandates, many will not be as forthcoming with their participation in the future because the robust missions take a heavy toll on the equipment.

2. **Limits on TCC Equipment**

Similarly, in the case of robust mandates, it becomes imperative for TCCs to go beyond agreed levels of equipment in order to accomplish the mission and enhance security and protection of troops. To avoid more casualties and public backlash at home, TCCs will be compelled to push whatever is necessary to the mission area for the troops to work effectively. However, there is resistance at times by the UN to ship additional Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) and reimburse it.

Reforms needed: The UN must be ready and keen to accept, reimburse, and facilitate shipping of extra COE if a TCC deems it necessary to be included for the benefit of the "boots on the ground." It all points to greater flexibility and careful listening to the concerns of TCCs in order for future peace operations to be successful.

3. **Military Direction/Logistical Support and Emoluments**

Financial Issues

Because robust mandates are akin to war, military operations must have a clear direction. In the DRC for example, a Malawi contingent was told to stop operations in the Tongo Area barely after 30 minutes of commencement and before reaching Kahumiro Camp, the headquarters of a rebel group which was ten kilometers away. It was dangerous and tactically unsound to abruptly cease operations in that manner. Eight months later, there has still been no order to continue with the operation.

Reforms needed: This calls for proper coordination of military and diplomatic efforts in peace operations.

Most TCCs rely on UN for strategic airlift capabilities.

Reforms needed: Airlifts must be available throughout to ensure a consistent logistical chain so that the TCC can regularly resupply their troops, and troops should be able to go on leave during their tour of duty at the UN's expense if we are to curb HIV/AIDS and cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). The UN must consider providing this service freely to TCCs so that troops' morale is enhanced and UN peacekeeping is made more attractive.

Lastly, there is a marked difference in living and operating conditions between FIB troops and those of Framework Brigades, yet the benefits are similar in terms of emoluments.

Reforms needed: Allowances should vary depending on the intensity and risks involved.

Benson Linje
Malawi Defense Force

Financial Issues

Special Political Missions

"Unlike peacekeeping operations, political missions are paid for out of the UN's regular budget along with conferences and air-conditioning."[2]

The asymmetry between missions – making a better and urgent case for a new system to fund, deploy and sustain SPMs: It is more than twenty years since Member States began to create the current system to finance and deploy peacekeeping operations. Change came after peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans, and when a growing community of UN Military Attachés became determined to improve support for their contingents. The Brahimi Report then articulated a broader vision of change for multidimensional operations. However, since then, Member States have still not approved a parallel and linked system to finance special political missions, even after the number of field-based SPMs spiraled more than 15 years ago and their Council mandates have since doubled.[3] Arcane SPM funding politics prevent UN staff from receiving the same standard of support as PKOs, or from designing more creative missions. This problem persists while in 2014 it is not possible to distinguish between many conflict environments and mandate language in countries hosting PKOs and SPMs.[4]

If environments and mandates may be similar, the spectrum of missions the panel has been tasked to review are vastly different. In a PKO there may be 100 public information officers to implement their mandate; in an SPM there may be one spokesperson. PKOs may have over 50 integrated field sites deployed across some of the largest countries in the world, a medium sized air force and trucking fleet. The footprint for many SPMs is one office in the capital city, dwarfed by UN Agency, Funds and Programs: a 'peace office' not a 'peace operation.' With all SPMs in their remit, the Panel will cover 1-person roving envoy missions and sanctions committees that are even further from the 'peace operation' designation. It may be timely therefore to suggest that the SPM bureaucratic nomenclature is changed, and names match what different missions have been shown to do. On tailoring support to match mandates, the capacities asked for in the *Global* Field Support Strategy (A/64/633) were designed to support battalions in desert conflict zones for 90 days. Not a single provision was designed for, or is overtly available to, SPMs. To conduct urgent mediation in a conflict-affected area some SPMs might just need a pre-stocked 20-foot container ready in Brindisi with a 4WD and other supplies to operate a remote office.

---

[2] Richard Gowan, *UN peace operations: the case for strategic investment*, CIC, August 2010
[3] See Figures I and II, Report of the Secretary-General, A/66/340, 12 October 2011
[4] See mandates from 10 field-based SPMs that are included with all 16 PKOs in 'Mandate components of current peacekeeping and political missions', http://www.un.org/en/sc/programme/ (at 1 August 2014)

Financial Issues

Peacekeeping has an international network of advocates, often focused on military components at the expense of others.[5] SPMs have no such community or equivalent topical issues around the use of lethal force and protection of civilians, and no urgency for change that has been narrated internationally.[6] The Panel could consider arguing a case that provides an honest accounting of field-based SPMs that have faced failure in Timor (UNOTIL), CAR (UNOCA), and the escalating violence and limits of SPM conflict mitigation capacities in Libya (UNSMIL), Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Iraq (UNAMI). Although the Secretary-General presented practical SPM budget options in 2011 (A/66/340), a convincing substantive case for change has yet to be made to capitals. SPMs have been left as orphans, with staff working in dangerous conflict environments, exposed with cobbled together, ad hoc and slow support arrangements.

Adrian Morrice

---

[5] E.g.: the well organized and collegiate community of Military Attachés supporting the C34 and the Council's committee on and regular thematic debates about peacekeeping; senior officer veterans and Members of Parliament in troop contributing capitals, and; western government and INGO think tanks whose principle focus remains PKOs.

[6] One example is the September 2010 Security Council Summit debate on *Maintenance of International Peace and Security*. Substantive text on political missions in early drafts was removed and S/PRST/2010/18 had two paragraphs dedicated to peacekeeping, most of which could otherwise have applied to field-based political missions.

Peacebuilding and Inclusivity

Local knowledge and peacebuilding

Reform 1: Increase UN Support to Local Conflict Resolution

> For details and evidence, see my book *The Trouble with the Congo*.

Local conflicts over land, resources, and political power sustain violence in many war and post-war environments. In the rare cases where there have been comprehensive bottom-up peacebuilding efforts, these initiatives have been successful in helping make peace sustainable.

However, the dominant peacekeeping culture usually precludes action on local conflicts. Most international actors interpret violence as the consequence of national and regional causes alone, and UN staff view intervention at the macro levels as their only legitimate responsibility. The resulting neglect of local peacebuilding regularly dooms the international efforts.

In addition to any top-down intervention, conflicts must be resolved from the bottom up. Whenever possible, local actors (subnational authorities, grassroots non-governmental organizations) should be in control of the bottom-up peacebuilding process. UN peacekeepers should increase financial, logistical, and technical support to these local actors.

Reform 2: Value More Local and Country-Specific Knowledge

> For details and evidence, see my book *Peaceland*, part I.

Peacekeeping missions value thematic and technical knowledge over local and country-specific expertise. This has many unintended consequences that decrease the effectiveness of international efforts.

Although the UN should continue to hire individuals with thematic expertise, they should also recruit foreign staff with an in-depth understanding of local contexts and knowledge of local languages. They would do well to include these latter criteria in the periodic evaluations of their employees for retention and promotion.

Peacekeeping missions should also invert the prevailing practice of foreigners making decisions while local people merely assist or execute orders. Local staff and counterparts should do things themselves and act as the primary decision makers. Expatriates should remain in the shadows to help and advise.

Another important measure would be to progressively replace most of the expatriates with local staff. Peacekeeping missions could retain foreigners only in posts that no local candidates can fill.

Reform 3: Change Everyday Peacebuilding Practices on the Ground

For details and evidence, see my book *Peaceland*, part II.

Everyday routines of most international peacekeepers on the ground involve socializing primarily with other expatriates, advertising their actions, and living in fortified compounds. These practices are not just ineffective. They are often counterproductive to building peace.

International peacekeepers should socialize more with local counterparts. They should use more the acceptance approach to security, whereby protection depends on developing good relationships with local communities, armed groups, and power brokers. And they should keep a low profile and avoid advertising their actions.

Séverine Autesserre
Barnard College, Columbia University

Peacebuilding and Inclusivity

A peacebuilding approach to UN peace operations

The Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) has focused on peace issues at the United Nations since 1947. Our experience leads us to seek a more holistic UN approach to peace and security issues that would strengthen societies by building the relationships between individuals, communities and the state. To achieve this, UN peace operations must shift towards a peacebuilding approach, focused on the social and political elements that will build a society's resilience, in the short and long-term. Such an approach would include the following elements:

It would be more inclusive

A peacebuilding approach would mean bringing together all key stakeholders from strategy to solutions, in particular local communities, civil society organizations, women and youth. This would mean rethinking how the UN rolls out a peace operation, from conflict analysis to mandate setting and to the day to day tasks of a mission. By being more inclusive, the UN would become more relevant and responsive to the realities on the ground, and be better placed to respond to threats of violent conflict without the use of force.

It would address the root causes of conflict

A peacebuilding approach would mean addressing not only immediate crisis needs but looking more deeply at what is truly driving a conflict and what role a UN peace operation can play in supporting local capacities for mediating and preventing violence. This approach would take into account the local context, identifying and supporting existing social structures and capabilities, both inside and outside the state. It also means creating the space for locally-led dialogue and reconciliation processes, in order to set the stage for long-term, not just short-term, peace.

It would prioritize peace

A peacebuilding approach would ultimately mean that the UN relies less on its security tools and more on its political tools. The global shift over recent years towards militarized solutions to violent conflict is mirrored in the increase in 'robust' UN peace operations, most notably the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC. This raises serious concerns however about how the UN can remain an impartial actor with a charter to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." The current situations in South Sudan, CAR, and Iraq also demonstrate the limitations of a security approach. It is time for the UN to rethink its value added in times of conflict and prioritize peace.

Andrew Tomlinson and Camilla Campisi
Quaker UN Office

Peacebuilding and Inclusivity

Peacemaking and Inclusive Politics

At the current juncture, the main challenge for UN peace operations is to reconnect mission activities to the crucial role of peacemaking. The complexity of contemporary violent conflicts necessitates a heightened focus on mediation and political facilitation aimed at helping the parties solve their fundamental differences in a non-violent manner. Providing such assistance in a timely and appropriate manner should be the primary objective of UN peace operations and serve as a guiding principle for the fulfillment of other more specific tasks in the mandate.

The importance of inclusive political processes has long been recognized as a fundamental prerequisite for lasting peace. In the context of asymmetrical conflicts in fragile states, this presents hard dilemmas of engaging constituencies that are represented by non-state armed actors. Especially when being tasked to assist in the extension of state authority, missions tend to work primarily with the host government. This reflects mandates as much as mindsets. Recent experience, however, show that this is not a viable approach in situations where fundamental political problems remain unsolved and/or the government lacks popular legitimacy.

The necessity—and difficulty—of getting the local politics right is directly associated with the complexity and danger of the environments. A key factor for future success will thus be to strengthen missions' ability to adapt to the evolving political dynamics of the host society. At the every-day level this hinges on two fairly mundane requirements:

- *Competent leadership in the field.* In addition to his/her personal capacity to maneuver on the local political scene and in the diplomatic arena, the SRSG needs the backing of a solid team of politically astute military and civilian leaders.

- *Country-specific knowledge.* Missions need highly-qualified staff with an in-depth understanding of the host society, including the conflict history. Having access to local knowledge is vital to the quality of political analysis, including intelligence.

At a more strategic level, the need to strengthen the political role of missions calls for revisiting the relationship between the field and headquarters and considering ways of ensuring that the leadership of integrated missions have sufficient room for maneuvering in a timely and contextual manner.

Louise Riis Andersen, PhD
Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies

Stabilization

Do we need a UN stabilization doctrine?

UN peacekeeping has become increasingly robust and offensive and is now regularly deployed in the midst of on-going conflicts. This is a radical departure from the Brahimi Panel's guidance that UN peacekeeping should not be deployed where there is 'no peace to keep'.

What does 'stabilization' mean in a UN peacekeeping context? What is the difference between UN missions, like MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA that have 'stabilization' in their name and those that don't? At present neither the Security Council nor the Secretariat is able to answer this question.

If we analyze these missions we can broadly say that what they have in common is that they operate in the midst of on-going conflicts; that their mandates task them to protect a government against an insurgency or identified aggressors; and that they are tasked to undertake robust operations, including offensive operations.

Although they share with many other missions a Protection of Civilian mandate and ethos, they differ fundamentally from missions like UNAMID and UNMISS that are strictly impartial, including to their host governments. In contrast, the stabilization missions cooperate closely with their host governments, and they may undertake offensive operations against insurgents in support of host government forces.

The essential difference between peacekeeping and stabilization seems to be that in peacekeeping the aim is to arrive at and maintain a cease-fire and/or implement a peace agreement among the parties to a conflict, whilst in stabilization the theory of change is to achieve peace by managing or removing an aggressor.

Conceptual confusion leads to doctrinal confusion, and in all three missions we witness that the Security Council, the Secretariat, the Troop and Police Contributing Countries and the host governments do not share the same understanding of what these missions are meant to do. Some approach these missions as any other UN peacekeeping mission they support or deploy troops to. Others see this as a special type of UN operations that is offensive, and they deploy troops and equipment appropriate for this purpose.

The Panel will have to provide guidance on whether the UN should do stabilization, and if so, whether it needs to update or expand its doctrine to include stabilization, so that all those involved can have a common understanding of how UN stabilization differs from peacekeeping.

Cedric de Coning
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

Stabilization

Revisit Stabilization in the United Nations

"Stabilization" is an increasingly influential concept in security and development circles. It is the object of growing attention amongst military strategists, and stability operations have been applied in at least 50 fragile settings by the United States government alone. Yet the conceptual and operational parameters of stabilization are still ambiguous and its record of effectiveness on the ground is both mixed and poorly evaluated. The UN's approach to stabilization is especially sensitive and problematic.

Although the Security Council has authorized "stabilization" interventions on several occasions, there is a remarkable lack of clarity about what it is, what it is intended to achieve and when it begins or ends.

There is no agreed definition of stabilization in the UN or outside of it. Nor is there agreed prescriptive guidance on how it ought to be undertaken. While some doctrine, manuals, and guidelines have been generated for certain governments, these are not recognized or used by UN agencies. The UN is surprisingly silent on the technical content of and underlying rationale for stabilization. In the most general terms, stabilization appears to constitute a "transition" from large-scale peacekeeping operations in areas affected by widespread insecurity to more modest security and development packages.

The 2008 DPKO Capstone Doctrine discusses "stability" and "security" as goals but does not refer explicitly to stabilization. The 2009 *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* also avoids mentioning stabilization overtly. Apart from featuring in the names of certain UN peace operations, including those in Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and Central African Republic there is scarce mention of the term in any Security Council Resolutions or General Assembly statements. Rather, the expectations of stabilization are implied. It appears as a synonym for a "peacekeeping" mission, as a subcomponent of a peacekeeping mission, or a follow-on or additional activity including civilian surges and policing in the wake of a peacekeeping draw-down.

A common UN definition and concept of "stabilization" would allow for at least a minimum shared understanding across agencies of the political and institutional interests shaping its introduction and diffusion. In practice, however, UN-led stabilization efforts are often summarized by specialists as the transition between "late peacekeeping" and "early peacebuilding," or as a mix of the two. On the ground, stabilization is often reconceived and reinterpreted on the basis of Security Council, bilateral and national or host government interests. In all cases, the stated goals of stabilization missions are to promote security, enable the host government to assume its responsibilities, and to ultimately disappear.

Stabilization

At least some of the UN system's recent interest in stabilization stems from a wider preoccupation with "exit" or "consolidation" strategies that may enable a transition out of extended peace support operations without risking past gains. Fielding more than 180,000 blue helmets and civilian personnel around the world, the UN has been concerned with determining appropriate standards for transition and what is often described as peace consolidation, as well as intermediary forms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding requiring less resource-intensive deployments. The UN has refocused its energies on enhancing its civilian and policing capacity for deployment alongside wider peacekeeping activities.

Taken together, the UN's gradual adoption of the stabilization agenda appears to be driven as much by internal institutional pressures – to "act as one" and undertake integrated missions – as by a wider appreciation of external debates on the causes and consequences of state fragility. UN missions are now guided by doctrine that highlights the role of enforcement coupled with peacebuilding. UN peacekeeping principles and guidelines thus call for agencies to "create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the state's capacity to provide security." If nothing else, a focus on stabilization has started to reveal the many fault-lines inherent in pursuing these goals. There are also opportunities to clarify the UN's strategic priorities in many countries by articulating a common institutional concept of stabilization.

Robert Muggah
Igarape Institute

Stabilization

Militarization of peacekeeping; impartiality of peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping has come to dominate the field of international conflict resolution and the mediation of peace settlements, to the extent that the UN has even grown accustomed to boasting about how it deploys more military forces globally than any country except the US. But why should the US "empire of bases" be considered a legitimate comparison for an international organization supposedly devoted to peace? This speaks to just how far militarization and imperial ambition has overtaken peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping is in danger of being locked into perpetual expansion: the more it does, the more it is expected to do. It is high time this blue helmeted leviathan was scaled back, in order to allow alternative, more authentically pacific peace-providers and peace-making entrepreneurs to emerge, and for greater political experimentation and creativity to flourish in the provision of peace-making services. Why should the peace-making potential of good offices functions, technical commissions and ceasefire observation missions be monopolized by this aging relic of the Second World War?

In the post-Cold War world, the impartiality of UN peacekeeping has been hollowed out as it has been scaled up into nation-building and become the military arm of the Security Council. This is shown by the fact that UN and its assorted agencies and peacekeepers are increasingly considered targets in the world's war zones. In such a world, it is likely that there will be other actors – states and non-state peace-providers – who could develop a more credible reputation for authentic neutrality, which could in turn make for more effective and less domineering peace-making. UN peacekeeping is too centralized and too compromised by its subordination to the antiquated power structures of the UN Security Council and the agendas of the P5. In an increasingly multipolar world, the militarized practice of UN peacekeeping has allowed the (mostly fading) great powers of the Security Council to boost their power and police international order on the cheap by roping the security forces of developing countries into peacekeeping.

The two most immediate ways of scaling back the peace leviathan is to begin by first, demilitarizing peacekeeping – enough drones, special forces, intervention brigades and attack helicopters – and second, by uncoupling peacekeeping from nation-building and the provision of humanitarian aid.

Philip Cunliffe
Senior Lecturer in International Conflict, University of Kent

Rapid Deployment and Force Generation

Reforms for the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations to Consider

Reform need 1: **Improve the UN's ability to rapidly deploy peacekeeping operations and to swiftly adjust ongoing operations to new conflict dynamics and changing security conditions.**
Reform will need to include:
- Development of new standards and procedures for the rapid deployment of peacekeeping operations.
  - Developing standby arrangements for key capacities, e.g. critical enablers, force headquarters, engineering capacities etc.
  - Developing more institutionalized partnerships with regional organizations.
    - Establishing an institutionalized financial partnership that allows the African Union and sub-regional organizations to launch rapid, interim missions.
    - Improve partnerships with regional rapid deployment capabilities, such as the European Union Battle Groups.
- A review of the UN-system for mission support, including the Global Field Support Strategy, in order to meet demands for quicker and more flexible deployments.
- More flexible use of deployed troops, including through more development of standards, more flexible standard operating procedures and agreements with troop contributing countries allowing for increased mobility of troops and inter-mission deployment.

Reform need 2: **Improve the quality and effectiveness of UN peacekeepers.**
Reform will need to include:
- A strategic force generation process that allows for flexible and dynamic engagement with troop and police contributing countries.
- Updating and revising UN standards and procedures for force generation to focus on capabilities.
- Strengthen partnership arrangements with external actors, especially in critical areas such as rapid deployment and enablers.
- Continue to develop mechanisms for capacity building and common standards for troop contributors.

Reform need 3: **Improve preconditions to meet new types of threats and more volatile operational environments.**
Reform will need to include:
- Development of standards and doctrine for peacekeeping in situations where there is no peace to keep, including force protection requirements.
- Further development of policy and doctrine for information-driven operations.

- o Development of policy and best praxis for how to use intelligence in complex conflict environments.
- A more flexible use of police resources in UN peacekeeping operations in order to meet increasing threats in areas such as transnational crime organizations.
  - o Increase UN access to policing resources (by increased communication and support to police contributing countries).

Cecilia Hull Wiklund and Claes Nilsson
Department of Peace Operations, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI

Rapid Deployment and Force Generation

Improve planning; speed up force generation and deployment

UN peacekeeping has come a long way since the dramatic failures of the mid-1990s, and indeed since the publication of the Brahimi report of 2000. With the deployment of more than 100,000 uniformed personnel in 16 operations spread over 4 continents, peacekeeping has not only become a prominent UN activity, but also a permanent one. It is important that the institutions supporting peacekeeping operations reflect such permanence.

For an organization with so much experience, planning, force generation and deployment simply take too long. The UN should engage in serious advance planning, if it wants to have a head-start when crises break out. This requires in-house capabilities in the Secretariat. Officials not only need to monitor emerging crises, but need to have plans ready when the Security Council asks for them. It is furthermore essential that while the Secretariat plans a mission, a Security Council pen-holder drafts the resolution. If the Security Council trusts the Secretariat with planning, it should limit itself to choosing options and taking decisions. Equally problematic is the late arrival of the SRSG and his/her ambiguous relationship with the Secretariat. The SRSG could, for example, already lead the fact-finding mission.

Force generation and rapid deployment are problematic for all multinational missions. The UN is no exception. It is necessary to start as early as possible – i.e. long before the adoption of the Security Council resolution. Regular TCCs should receive UN training to prepare them for their possible deployments. Shortfalls in capabilities not only need to be identified; they need to be addressed. It is, however, necessary to be realistic. Strategic assets, such as helicopters, are always in short supply. Planners should take that into account. Finally, while regional organizations can provide niche capabilities, such as air-lift, ambitious concepts, such as bridging missions, normally create more problems than they solve. The world of international politics is not one of a division of labor. The UN should be self-sufficient.

Peacekeeping planning in the UN suffers from adhocism and actor fragmentation. In a formal sense, there is a certain logic to it. And if the UN deployed small-scale operations only on occasions, it would not be such a problem. The UN, however, has become the go-to international organization for peacekeeping. This means that the standards are higher. All interested parties should recognize this and treat planning in a business-like manner.

Dr. Hylke Dijkstra
Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Maastricht University

Capacity-building and logistic assistance for peacekeeping rapid deployment in Africa

One idea to meet the impending need for well-prepared and rapid deployment of UN peacekeepers may be to introduce some sort of regional/ functional base system that supports such deployment. It is regional in the sense of each base covering a certain region (e.g., West Africa), but it should be functional in the sense that each "boundary" of that coverage changes depending on the level of demand. I am aware that there is already one support base at Entebbe, but given the size of the continent and the geographical diversity of mission areas there could be similar settings in other places. Also, it would be useful for that base to serve as a center for comprehensive capacity-building assistance in the field of peacekeeping logistics and operational management of the missions. With that function, the base can be usefully combined with non-UN assistance efforts (national and regional, e.g., EU). The idea of regional/ functional base system can also be extended to other regions (e.g., the Middle East) if there is a demand for it, but in the meantime the assistance should be focused on Africa.

Hikaru Yamashita
National Institute for Defense Studies (Japan)

Rapid Deployment and Force Generation

Doctrine and rapid deployment

1) Operationalizing doctrine

UN peacekeeping doctrine is inadequate and unread - TCCs bring their own highly disparate approaches to what they believe peacekeeping operations should entail – there is almost no common doctrine of training for respective missions and a serious communications deficit. Member-states and UN agencies, including DPKO and DFS, must do much better in setting and operationalizing UN military doctrine in the future. 'Time lost' in mission learning UN concepts and operational structures remains a widespread problem for TCCs. The existing standards oversight capability in DPKO needs to be significantly enhanced in order to effectively reduce this loss.

2) Re-booting UNSAS

UNSAS battalions are a 'lowest common denominator' – the 'one size fits all' battalion of approximately 850 troops has not changed in decades; neither has UNSAS met its original expectations. It now requires urgent reform. Stand-by-arrangements should encourage the pooling of a range of different capabilities, including an emphasis on mobility and combat readiness. Additionally a new system must recognize the capability disparities among TCCs and establish a mechanism that will facilitate the effective blending of TCC capabilities in order to quickly tailor an appropriate response to divergent conflicts. Synergies with regional organizations should also be better explored.

3) Give UN military personnel more control over key assets

UN military personnel lack control over critical assets such as air-lift capabilities. Rigorous 'duty of care' expectations for civilian staff and a lack of understanding of military requirements on the part of civilian personnel can impede military operations. Procurement and logistical supply should be separated – the former should be a civilian preserve while the military should take responsibility for delivery of key operational assets in-theatre. UN member states should also be encouraged to deploy more military air assets under UN command.

4) Establishing an Operational or Regional Headquarters for Peacekeeping Missions

FCs and DFCs need more time to look inward at the day-to-day tactical issues affecting a peacekeeping mission rather than constantly looking back to New York to gain political or logistical support. The establishment of and division of labor between: i) an operational military headquarters or regional headquarters and ii) an in-theatre field headquarters would help solve this problem.

Edward Burke and Jonathan Marley

Rapid Deployment and Force Generation

Force generation

Some twenty years ago, UN Peacekeeping was lauded as an almost universal 'recipe for success.' Not much later, the UN was damned for its perceived failures in Rwanda, Somalia and former Yugoslavia. Needless to say, both opinions were awfully exaggerated. In the meantime, other organizations became increasingly engaged in crisis management. One consequence was the reduced participation of European countries, and a reduced visibility of UN peace efforts. Enhancing the latter might in turn lead to increased engagement by developed countries.

Enhancing visibility does not mean hiring a better PR agency (although this might help, too), but to increase understanding and awareness for the purpose and the difficulties of UN operations among the public in general, and among the political and diplomatic leadership in particular.

This refers not only to these operations' military aspects, but also to the increasingly important police and civilian components. Joint and integrated pre-deployment training programs might assist in team building and better understanding between these elements with their distinct organizational cultures.

We need to think of ways to reward member states who make it easier – and not more difficult – for its civil servants and police officers to volunteer for mid- to long-term engagements in UN peacekeeping. Unlike the military, where service abroad has become a normal career path in most countries, to go on a mission means an end or at least a grave interruption of their careers for civilian specialists in most countries.

A general lament is the unrealistic expectations of mandates, and the lack of willingness to change or adapt these in time to changed circumstances – the UNDOF operation in Syria is just one of many examples. But this, of course, addresses less the UN as an organization, but rather the member states, especially the P-5. The same applies to the reluctance of member states to contribute (qualified and well-trained) personnel.

Erwin A. Schmidl
Director
Institute for Strategy and Security Policy at the Austrian National Defense Academy, Vienna

Mandates

UN Peace Operations: Doing what can be done and providing for it

One of the current main shortcomings of UN peace operations is the authorization of mandates that are not fully implemented. While sometimes this happens because of the emergence of unpredictable external factors, it is common to see mandates whose implementation is hindered by insufficient planning or operationally unrealistic recommendations in the first place. Examples of this disconnect include the limited success of the inter-mission cooperation arrangements to provide the UN Mission in South Sudan with additional troops after the crisis in December 2013; the sluggish pace in which the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali has been deployed (a year and a half since its establishment, MINUSMA has yet to reach its full operational capacity); and the difficulties in ensuring that the re-hatted contingents in Central African Republic or Mali meet UN standards in terms of equipment and capacity. While the Security Council is ultimately responsible for issuing these decisions, the mandates are usually adopted following specific recommendations provided by the Secretary-General.

These operational inadequacies do not only hinder the implementation of specific Council mandates but more broadly, risk delegitimizing the UN's involvement in such critical moments. In this context, it might be useful for the Panel to examine the potential of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) for providing advice on the military requirements of UN peace operations. The current pool of military advisors to the Council's permanent representatives is a hugely underutilized resource. While largely dormant since its inception in the UN Charter, over the past couple of years the MSC has been holding regular substantive meetings, has undertaken a recent field mission and it has informally involved the military advisors of the ten elected members in its activities. The Panel may wish to look at the MSC as a tool that could provide a space where military planning developed by the Secretariat is given due consideration prior to the Council's strategic decisions.

Developing a more reliable and accountable system of UN peace operations will serve better the needs of the populations they strive to serve and will be instrumental in encouraging the involvement of new actors to consider providing troops. That will also contribute to minimizing caveats and operational limitations which new troop- and police-contributing countries might have when deployed in new theatres.

Joanna Weschler
Security Council Report

Mandates

Mandates and risk aversion

UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) have become very distant from the people they are expected to serve, support and protect. Peacekeeping missions have grown in size and scope of mandate and, in the current political context, it has not been easy to maintain a focus on the mandate and simultaneously ensure the safety of staff, particularly after the attack on the UN office in Baghdad in 2003. However, risk management has come to be interpreted as risk aversion. This risk averse environment is seriously hindering the effectiveness and success of PKOs on the ground and their ability to fulfil mandates and achieve goals. The United Nations Department of Safety and Security is more and more reluctant to take risks, much to the frustration of civilian peacekeepers who often feel they are unable to fulfil their tasks, particularly in rural and hard-to-reach areas. This growing risk aversion needs to be pushed back if UN PKOs are to remain truly meaningful. This involves a shift in mind-set, where risks are mitigated, in line with UN OCHA's 2011 report *To Stay and Deliver,* which could be used as an example of possible considerations and approaches.

Secondly, UN PKO mandates have become all-encompassing with a multitude of tasks. However, there are aspects that contradict themselves and as such weaken the strategic impact and success of a UN mission. For example, there is a paradox in expecting a UN PKO to support a host government and simultaneously protect civilians who are often face the risk of violence by that same host government, as recently seen in South Sudan and UNMISS. Mandates should be streamlined to consider and avoid such contradictions that make a PKOs' position on the ground very difficult and with expectations that are impossible to fulfil.

Finally, the potential of the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus is significant but requires greater flexibility and contextualization in its approach (also in relation to the above points). This includes greater decentralization of decision-making at the local-level, under the capable leadership of the Civil Affairs Section.

Diana Felix da Costa
Research Associate at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and
PhD Candidate, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London

Mandates

Addressing the Expectations Gap

By nature, peace operations are ambitious. They are about bringing peace to societies that have gone through often long periods of instability and war. As they are the most visible part of the international response to state fragility, they tend to raise expectations about what they are going to achieve. However, the complexity and length of "bringing peace" is such that expectations are inevitably disappointed, regardless of the organization – or state(s) – in charge of the peacekeeping/peacebuilding efforts. This is not to say that peacekeeping is doomed to fail; the point is rather that there exists a pernicious relationship between the level of ambition of UN peace operations' mandates and the ensuing local expectations on the one hand, and what peace operations can realistically deliver on the other hand. "Limited achievements" is inherent to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In the medium to long term, this misperception negatively impacts the legitimacy and credibility of the UN.

In this context:

- The UN and its Member States must, once again, revisit the way mandates are being designed so as to minimize the expectation gap; dialogue with local leaders and civil society groups must also be clear about what the UN operation will realistically be in a position to achieve, and what it will not. This is particularly important in the field of civilian protection, where there is a tension between the moral imperative of protecting civilians that are physically threatened and the feasibility of such a task. SSR or good governance are also domains where the impact of external interventions is likely to remain limited in the short run;
- As already put in the Brahimi Report, the UN should not be asked to do what it is not structurally, culturally and politically organized to do. Most specifically, any move towards a more assertive conception of the use of force should be accompanied by the utmost prudence, and in any case be *ad hoc*. This is so because:
  - a military option carried out by UN peacekeepers cannot be a long term response to what are fundamentally political problems, and
  - there might well be threats – such as the ones posed by radical armed groups – that the UN is simply not in a position to confront in any significant military manner.

Wherever the use of force becomes part of the international response, a clear distinction between the openly coercive component of the multidimensional operation and the UN peacekeeping part is essential to the UN legitimacy and overall long-term impact.

Dr. Thierry Tardy
EU Institute for Security Studies (writes in his personal capacity)

Mandates

Saving Peace Operations? Empower, Rebalance, and Globalize.

Dangerous mandates, the extremist threat, limited peacebuilding success, and a huge gap between the expectations for protecting civilians and the UN's capabilities are symptoms for more fundamental challenges. I would submit three responses:

(1) To paint a realistic vision for peace operations that do not last forever, the Security Council, Secretariat and missions need to find context-specific ways (and be empowered by Member States) to **actively manage the politics of stabilization and peacebuilding in host countries. Technical and security assistance must serve a political strategy** that is coordinated between the UN and the main bilateral stakeholders. Outside or in lieu of a political strategy, capacity-building can be useless and even counterproductive, but capacity-building in the service of a political strategy can make political progress more likely and save on the financial and human resource footprint of missions. Effective political engagement will take different institutional forms in each context, depending on how best to engage the relevant regional and international actors.

(2) If peace operations as an instrument are not to break apart, **we need to rebalance mandates, force generation and funding.** Mandates need more humility and realism, but growing threats to peacekeepers are here to stay – there is no way back to the 1990s without inviting another Srebrenica. Risk must be limited differently, by giving blue helmets, blue berets and blue suits the best possible support and protection. The UN's paymasters need to lift the arbitrary cap on peacekeeping expenditures and provide the staff resources to allow mission-specific instead of template-driven planning, which will enable reducing the military footprint in some missions. Both Northern and Southern countries with capable militaries, police, and civilian capacities must do more to provide enablers, modern technology, and specialized capabilities to missions, and to offer training and support to large contributors of personnel.

(3) The new peacekeeping bargain must be genuinely global. It will be crucial for rebuilding trust in peace operations to **open up informal channels of consultation on mandates, strategy, and operations to all crucial stakeholders, particularly regional powers and major personnel contributors.** It is primarily on the P3 to devolve influence both in the Security Council and in their interactions with the Secretariat, while those that want access need to develop the analytical and political capacity to constructively co-manage peace operations rather than defending just their own interests.

Philipp Rotmann (with assistance from Sarah Brockmeier, Gerrit Kurtz, and Thorsten Benner)
Associate Director
Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)

Mandates

Between doctrine and practice

Over the last couple of years UN peace operations have undergone monumental transformations, challenging the core tenets of peacekeeping. Authorization of intervention brigades, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, use of intelligence and strategic communication, and statebuilding mandates in the midst of conflicts have all expanded the scope of activities beyond what UN peacekeepers are accustomed to. Of core concern to the Panel should therefore be a question of whether the concept of peacekeeping has become overstretched. In order to allow mission success, all stakeholders need to have a common understanding of what peacekeeping means and what principles it follows.

Particular attention should be paid to the emergence of "enforcement peacekeeping," including support for governments in the midst of on-going conflicts. It needs to be openly acknowledged that authorizations of enforcement mandates (DRC) and support for actors engaged in enforcement missions (France in Mali, AU in Somalia) detract from the existing peacekeeping doctrine. If such operations remain under the peacekeeping umbrella, support should be lent to structures that consider their longer-term implications for peacebuilding and how supporting one side in a conflict affects regional dynamics and peace processes. For these missions, context sensitivity is of even greater importance.

In this regard, it is key to address the roles played by regional actors. While regional involvement has primarily been seen as positive, the UN should be wary of deploying peacekeepers to areas where they might be perceived as instruments of their own government's policies. We have seen this with Chadian involvement in the CAR and Ethiopian involvement in Somalia. This not only has implications for the command structures, but can also negatively predispose the local population towards the peacekeeping mission overall.

The Panel should also consider the implications of broad, all-encompassing mandates with conflicting priorities. Particularly problematic are missions where the UN supports governments implicated in atrocities against civilians (South Sudan, Darfur). While at the international level these missions are perceived as "protection of civilians missions," at an operational level, they are perceived by local actors as primarily supporting and building the capacities of host governments. Although these two priorities can go hand in hand, in reality they often clash. Missions should be clear on what they are focusing on and who their primary beneficiaries are.

Dr. Mateja Peter
Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Mandates

Mandates; engaging the local population; training

To get to the heart of the mounting difficulties facing UN peace operations, the panel will have to come to grips with several uncomfortable truths that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN peace operations community more broadly have refused to confront. The first and most important is that peace operations must embrace their inherently political nature. The mandate provided by the Security Council constitutes the rough outline of a political vision – one which inevitably alters the balance and distribution of power in a conflict or society. Regardless of formal consent, those actors that stand to lose power will almost inevitably resist and it is up to the mission planners and leadership to develop the political vision into a coherent strategy to overcome that resistance. Peace operations should engage as many actors as possible as partners, but recognize that others will have to be induced, cajoled, or outright coerced to accept the political vision articulated in the mandate. This does not imply a descent into warfighting; only a recognition that a strategic approach is required to reassure fearful partners, deter opportunists, and defeat determined spoilers.

The second uncomfortable truth is that top-down political approaches are rarely sufficient to build lasting peace. Factional leaders often prove duplicitous, self-serving, incapable of controlling their followers, or vulnerable to challenges from hard liners within their own power base. Thus building peace requires looking beyond elites to directly influence the communities on whom they depend for support. It means engaging the population not only on a humanitarian or development basis, but as a critical component of the political strategy. Protecting civilians from violence, ensuring their access to essential services, and giving them a voice in the political process are not just ethical imperatives: they are central to a hard-nosed, pragmatic approach to achieving political goals.

Incorporating these principles into an update of the 2008 Principles and Guidelines would be a good start, but applying them would require fundamental change in the culture and practice of peace operations. Although often valuable, backgrounds in diplomacy, the military, development, or humanitarian work are not adequate preparation to develop and implement integrated political-military strategies. Those who plan, lead, and execute peace operations need a deeper understanding of the nature of the conflicts they are expected to help resolve, the nature of the tools with which they work, and the nature of peace operations themselves. That understanding and the change that would come with it can only be achieved through professionalization: a process to systematically provide new and existing staff with the knowledge and skills they need to translate the aspirations of peace operations into reality.

Max Kelly
Associate at Booz Allen Hamilton and a Research Fellow at the Center for Complex Operations
at National Defense University

Police

UN Police

International police assistance mandates have changed over the past two decades. Activities have become increasingly wide-ranging and complex, moving from monitoring host State police officers to supporting the reform and restructuring of police organisations. In a few exceptional cases, (most recently Kosovo and Timor-Leste) 'executive' police mandates involve substituting for inadequate or absent policing and law enforcement capacity. Both executive and non-executive missions have focused on building capacity of the host State police, a task complicated by weak governance, fragile institutions, community dislocation, rapid urbanisation and transnational criminal groups.

Given the complex environments within which police assistance missions are deployed, a diverse set of skills and knowledge are required to successfully fulfil their mandate; these skills require additional training. It is often assumed that technical experts in fields, such as police investigations, at the national level can be easily deployed to fragile contexts and automatically become a qualified or effective mentor, advisor or even institution builder. In reality, police officers often find this transition difficult, especially when operating in unfamiliar environments, they need additional training in these fields.

Given the complex environment and the focus on improving policing in fragile states, the skill sets required also extend beyond traditional policing capacity. The reform of a country's system of policing not only focuses on the police institution itself but should also include those who manage (the relevant government ministry) and oversight (internal, external and parliamentary oversight bodies) policing services (some of which may be provided by non-state actors). Police reform is a political as well as technical process. It requires a mix of skills, ranging from financial management to strategic and political process management. At the moment in most bilateral, regional and UN missions, only serving or former police officers are eligible for posts. This severely limits the ability to match mission needs to the required skills. What can be done to create the multi-disciplinary (including civilian capacity) teams required to ensure the right type of support to police assistance missions, and to ensure such support leads to sustainable reforms?

Recognising that most UNPOL officers come from member states that themselves might have policing challenges requires a recognition that UN deployments are, simultaneously, both assistance missions and a means to develop PCC policing capacity. There is a strong argument to improve *in-mission training* to enable officers to develop and master the skills they need for the post, whilst on mission. Access to in-service training on 'how to be an effective advisor' or on 'police reform in challenging environments or on 'police reform within an SSR context' would enable officers to better position their experience within the missions mandate. This

Police

would require a re-think of UN pre-deployment training, induction and in-service training. It should also be recognised that such capacity building activities would have benefits—for individual UNPOL officers and their home force—beyond the immediate peacekeeping mission.

Make sure we learn and adapt our approach over time. Given the time it takes to fully understand the context in which we are working and to become fully operational, the tendency is to continue the work and approach of your predecessor. So in effect the mission could be doing the same things, each year for ten years, without adapting its approach to the changing political, security and capacity circumstances. UN missions need internal means of gathering lessons and providing advice for police components. The UN's standing police capacity could play a greater role in auditing police components, gathering lessons and becoming a knowledge hub in international police support.

Proposals

1) **Induction Training** – roll out new induction training (developed and tested in Liberia) across UN peacekeeping missions, together with a means to ensure that the training quality and approach is maintained. This training focused on understanding the mandate, the national context, the role of UNPOLs and how to be an effective advisor.

2) **In-Service Training** – recognise the need for in-service training within peacekeeping missions, to better build the requisite skills of UN officers to fulfil their mandates.

3) **Including more civilian capacity** – adapt human resource regulations to enable more civilians to service in UNPOL components, to focus on the political/governance issues.

4) **UNPOC** – continue to update and adapt the current UNPOC courses. Recoginsing the need to expand the number of countries running UNPOC training, consideration should be given to developing a system to twin those PCCs without UNPOC training with those that have a well established system in order to build their capacity to run UNPOC courses;

5) **Match skills to mission requirements** – develop specific job descriptions for UNPOL posts, to ensure recruitment fulfils specific tasks;

6) **Reinforce the Standing Police Capacity as an audit, knowledge hub** – develop the role of the Standing Police Capacity to a) undertake audits of police components; b) enhance planning for missions; c) act as a repository of knowledge and guidance.

Tor Tanke Holm   *Mark Downes*
Deputy Director   *Assistant Director DCAF and Head, DCAF's International*
Norwegian Police University College   *Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT)*

Police

Consider a Greater Role for UNPOL in the Protection of Civilians

UNPOL has developed significantly over the past 10 years. It has undertaken a wide range of deployments in conflict and post-conflict situations as a component of UN peacekeeping operations. The majority of the deployments have focused on capacity building for national police and most if not all have operated without an executive law enforcement authority. UNPOL is often expected or implicitly assumed to play a role in the protection of civilians; however, police often lack the means, authority, training, guidance, mission-specific strategy, and, in some cases, the willingness to intervene directly to halt violence against civilians. Without working under an executive mandate UNPOL activities are constrained.

If properly equipped, trained, and mandated, UNPOL could be an even more effective component of UN peace missions. The inclusion of more female officers and those with relevant cultural and language skills would greatly facilitate engagement with local communities and in turn enable UNPOL to play an increased role in identifying and mitigating threats to civilians. The development of comprehensive and technical guidance for UNPOL should be seriously considered. A comprehensive approach to policing, the judiciary and the penal system should be strengthened within peace missions.

Coordination between Humanitarian Actors and UN Peacekeeping Missions

With the onset and increased number of UN Integrated Missions, clear country specific coordination guidance is ever more important in order to achieve mission and humanitarian outcomes, avoid duplication and competition, ensure preservation of humanitarian space, access, and the upholding of humanitarian principles. When the humanitarian community and UN Mission invest concerted effort, structured guidance is and can assist the diverse actors to reconcile tensions between the political, security and humanitarian imperatives and develop complementary approaches on common priorities such as the protection of civilians and the pursuit of peace and durable solutions.

Recently representatives from the humanitarian community and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) developed such guidelines based on the spirit of mutual respect and desire to increase the effectiveness of the comprehensive endeavor of meeting the immediate humanitarian needs, increasing stability, and supporting the people of DRC to achieve lasting peace. When planning and launching future UN peacekeeping missions, especially integrated missions, greater investment should be made upfront to ensure guidance and standard operating procedures are in place to more effectively safeguard humanitarian action from inappropriate convergence with security and political objectives.

World Vision International

Military Component

Towards a political-military approach for UN peacekeeping operations

The main challenge for the UN is to slowly move from a purely civilian organization (where the military is viewed with suspicion) towards a more integrated civil-military organization that would benefit from both civil and military expertise.

- UN peacekeeping continues to be done "on the cheap" (and that is likely to remain so in the near future). It is a fact that peacekeeping developed in an *ad hoc* manner and as a civilian tool; it has always been organized with civilian tools (budget, personnel, structure, support). With such means (i.e. general lack of resources), UN peacekeeping has performed rather well in all of the complex situations it has been involved in during the past 60 years. This has to be acknowledged.

- UN peacekeeping operations are not only military operations, as they deal with the whole spectrum of crisis management, and they always give priority to the political solution. That constitutes a clear added value of the UN and that should remain so, as there is no military solution to any crisis or conflict. However, peacekeeping operations are also military operations, and the military component of multidimensional operations (which constitutes 80% of UN deployments on the ground) should be treated as such, i.e. have the means and the capabilities to perform their military tasks with efficiency.

- The military leadership should therefore have the leverage to plan and organize its force, both in terms of tactical operations on the ground but also the logistical support that is needed. And this should be the case even if it is crucial to maintain a civilian decision over the strategic objectives and policies of a mission. There should be no interference of civilians in the conduct of military operations, in particular in times of crisis. Military expertise should therefore be better strengthened at all levels (from the mission headquarters to the strategic headquarters in New York).

- Peacekeeping operations should be more integrated. This integration should not concern the work of the specialized agencies, funds and programs of the UN system, which should only be coordinated to avoid duplication of efforts. This integration concerns the daily work of all components (civilian, police, and military) of a mission, which should stop working in silos. They should better consult one another, share thoughts and information, communicate better and perform better together. The civilian chief of staff should be given a key (strengthened) role in that regard.

- The UN should deal with military matters with better military expertise: at the level of the Security Council with the Military Staff Committee, at the level of the Secretariat with more closely taking into account military expertise coming from the Office of

Military Affairs (that should be reinforced), and having more military personnel in the Department of Field Support.

Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff
Centre Thucydide, Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2)

Military Component

The double chain of command issue

When a country sends a military contingent in an UN operation, its government acts mainly for internal reasons and its decision is subject to regional constraints. When this contingent is on the ground, it will indeed try to act with the aim of fulfilling its peacekeeping task as efficiently as possible. However, it will remain submitted to the internal and regional constraints that determined its government contribution.

At best, these constraints will be reflected in "caveats" submitted to DPKO by the contributing nation. However, if such government does not dare to submit caveats, or if the UN refuses these, the modern communication technologies still allow the national GHQ, at any time and within minutes, to approve or disapprove the implementation by the national contingent commander of any order issued by the UN force commander. As the salary, the career, and the judicial status of the contingent commander remain in the hands of his national command, and as his primary loyalty remains to his country, national orders will always prevail.

To maintain the chances of success of the mission, the most important issue is to make sure that the contingent commanders will receive from their national HQ instructions consistent with those received from the Mission HQ. This convergence of orders can be reached only through a convergence of views in New York. In Brussels, such consistency is the natural result of the decision at the political level: all member states are represented in the North Atlantic Council or in the Political and Security Committee. When disagreements appear in the military implementation of the decision, the Military Committees, where all the General Chief of Staff are represented, become the venue where difficulties are promptly detected and fixed.

In the UN, most troop contributing countries are not members of the Security Council where the operations are decided, and there is no official permanent forum in which their military representatives could meet. Frequently, the Council, the TCCs and the Secretariat have different views on the field situation and on what must be done to go ahead. The Council can force its vision on the Secretariat, but not on the TCCs, whose information from the field is generally more realistic, even if patchy, than the official reports. Worse still, if the TCCs are better informed than in the past, they are not associated as real partners in the decision making, which remains the prerogatives of a Council whose key members stay away from PK operations. Therefore, if the UN HQ expects the TCCs HQ to provide their national contingent commanders with instructions in direct support of the UN Force Commanders' orders, it must invest huge and concerted efforts to assess the situation cooperatively and decide jointly. Not only will such cooperation not weaken the UN decision, but it will raise its quality and strengthen its legitimacy.

Patrice Sartre

Military Component

Political dialogue; new threat environments; use of force and PoC

Peace operations are deploying into complex threat environments, often lacking the necessary capabilities to respond to changing circumstances on the ground. Yet the international community continues to hold high expectations around what can be achieved. Several things need to change to address these challenges and close this gap.

First, **political dialogue among all peacekeeping stakeholders needs to improve**. Different views continue to exist among troop and police contributors on the roles and responsibilities of peacekeepers (i.e. on the use of force). Consensus is needed on the nature of peacekeeping and peace operations, particularly in light of more robust mandates. Communication among all stakeholders is essential. Forums for intergovernmental consultations are an important mechanism, but could benefit from more flexibility and engagement with the field. Informal mission specific coalitions (a recommendation from New Horizons) could be useful to facilitate stakeholder engagement and coordinate political support, particularly where the UN is operating alongside regional or sub-regional organizations.

Second, **peace operations need to be prepared to respond comprehensively to a range of threat environments**. The use of improvised explosive devices are an example of one concerning trend. Contributors need to be prepared, trained and equipped to operate in the environments they will be deployed to tomorrow, rather than yesterday. Enhanced contingency and futures planning in the Secretariat could assist. Improved coordination and training to address transnational organized crime and support implementation of sanctions regimes and arms embargoes (where applicable) would support long term efforts to address threats and enablers at their source.

Third, **clear guidance is still needed on the use of force and protection of civilians**. Confusion exists on the ground around support to host government security forces and whether the mission is responsible to protect civilians in contexts where the host government could respond. This uncertainty also extends into longer term efforts to balance mandated support to security sector reform with immediate protection needs (a challenge that has been highlighted by developments in UNMISS). Leadership has an important role here, but it can't address the gaps alone. Further strategic and tactical level guidance is needed.

Lisa Sharland
Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Leadership

Mission leadership and training

Mission leadership is a decisive success factor for contemporary peace operations. Accordingly, both United Nations organizations and member states should increase their focus on preparing qualified, mission-ready, civilian leaders. These leaders must be able to deploy rapidly to support early peacebuilding efforts and lead multidimensional missions to success.

The UN and member states would benefit from greater investment in leadership capacity building through multidimensional peace operation exercises that support deliberate experimentation for implementation of the comprehensive approach.

While the Brahimi Report identified the importance of effective, dynamic mission leadership its recommendations focused on the process of selection and the experience of senior mission leaders. It separated the issue of providing a pool of qualified civilian specialists from the issue of leadership, treating it as a career issue. Providing better leaders is not just a matter of career streaming or selecting senior leaders who possess experience in domestic politics or diplomacy. It requires leaders who have had the opportunity to experience a full range of relevant operational scenarios and whose management solutions are the result of experimentation.

Increasing the availability of experimental, exercise-based training to potential civilian leaders and managers will greatly expand the talent pool available for operations.

The current focus of leadership training remains on preparing military and police staff and adopts a competency-based approach. This approach is achievable in disciplined services, with clearly defined roles. Yet military and police training are constrained by their occupational objectives. The mission leadership will be civilian, and multidimensional mandates integrate political and development measures with security.

Future mission leadership teams need to be prepared advance of operations. Preparedness can be achieved by purpose-designed, experiential exercises that expose mission leaders, senior civilian staff, international organizations, non-government organizations, military and police to the spectrum of civilian operational activity outside the security focus.

Investment in leadership capacity building is also an investment in conflict prevention. The process of experimentation provides lessons that can inform the Integrated Assessment and Planning process and the construction of mandates. It promotes a more coherent international strategic approach to the effective implementation of peace operations.

Alan Ryan
Executive Director, Australian Civil-Military Centre

Leadership

Peacekeeping principles and mission leadership

The following issues stem from ongoing research efforts at Jena University.

1. Recalibrate the principles of peacekeeping and good offices

The very doctrine of peace UN peace operations has seen a tremendous transformation – even in the years since the Brahimi report. The classical principles of peacekeeping missions have come under stress and mean different things to different actors. It is necessary to revisit the original conception of peace operations and special political mission (avant la lettre). Member states have already called for a return to the "Hammarskjöld principles". But what exactly these principles are is often defined with a view to challenges at hand rather than a close look on what member states had actually agreed upon and implemented in the very first peace missions and operations.

2. Restructure the lifecycle of peace operations

The issue of sequencing and exit-strategies in peace operations has gained prominence in the reform debate. There is a need to identify the specific features of the lifecycle of peace operations according to which the resources, instruments and approaches very much depend on the respective time phase of the mission effort. These phases should not only be regarded as operational challenges but also as challenges regarding the legitimacy of an operation. Rather than employing a static concept of consent and support, a dynamic lifecycle model calls for (re)negotiating "peace compacts" of all stakeholders for each phase of the cycle. The model also would be a way to cut down on the multitude of simultaneous tasks in "Christmas-tree" resolutions.

3. Reinvest in the mission leadership

The tremendous increase in numbers and tasks of SRSGs as key actors in the security, development and human rights work of the UN has not received the amount of attention it deserves. While the UN cannot control all factors and influences that determine the success of failures of its peace operations, this is an area where it is largely in the hands of the organization and member states to organize selection processes, training and above all the dissemination of knowledge and experience from mission leaders. It will be imperative to reinvest the resources built and the experiences gained by capable mission leaders in order to better identify the opportunities and constraints with which they have to work.

Prof. Dr. Manuel Fröhlich
Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Professor of International Organizations and Globalization, Department of Political Science

Strategic Communications

Strategic communications in support of UN peace operations needs to be prioritized by the organization as a whole and decisively overhauled.

What is required for UN peace operations to have a positive, significant and lasting impact and assist in the transition from conflict to sustainable development? A variety of factors are in play, but lessons learned clearly shows that international engagements are unlikely to succeed without robust and carefully considered Strategic Communications capacity, which uses a variety of techniques to explain, clarify and advocate the mission of UN peace operations to key target audiences.

UN missions are increasingly deployed into volatile and inhospitable environments, facing new threats that require a range of creative and innovative responses. Peacekeeping is a partnership, and in order to manage evolving expectations and build lasting support among central constituencies, a broad based, well-resourced, and accurately evaluated strategic communication plan is required.

Peace operations are generally not successful through the threat or actual use of military force alone—nor should they be. UN peace operations strive to combine their unique mixture of "soft" and "hard" powers to create peace and stability. UN missions have begun to move from crisis communications and more classic 20th century public information capacities to a more modern strategic communications approach, underpinned by segmented audience targeting, regularly refined and adjusted and supported by the use of digital, social and other new media as well as more traditional forms of outreach. But **a decisively more strategic approach is acutely required if UN peacekeeping is to play the role in world affairs that it is expected to undertake.**

The UN needs to take charge, develop, and globally promulgate a new strategic communication approach fit for the purposes and challenges of the 21st century. Building on the findings of the Expert Panel on the use of new technologies and innovations, the focus now should be on what is required to develop and launch an overall set of contemporary guidance on Strategic Communication for today's UN peace operations, keeping in mind the range of new challenges and threats including asymmetric, technologically leveraged approaches used by non-state actors such as ISIS or Al-Shabaab.

It is thus proposed to convene a focused workshop on "Strategic communications for the new era of UN peace operations." It would be informed by commissioned background papers and involve leading expertise to develop findings on: a) strategic communications – optimal purpose, target groups, methodology and techniques b) how to effectively implement a strategic communications plan at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, c) Innovation – optimal use of new media platforms as well as other technologically driven tools, and d)

identification and development of new approaches to advocacy, campaigning and mobilization of support.

Annika Hilding Norberg
Director, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations
Folke Bernadotte Academy

Strategic Communications

Recalibrating Peace Operations: Three Suggestions

A new narrative for Peace Operations

Peace operations suffer from an image problem as well as from a plethora of divergent views on what they actually are or should be. A new narrative is needed, first, to secure investments into peace operations. Investments will be undertaken only by those who are convinced they are part of a winning exercise and who can offer sound arguments for their national constituencies. Second, a new narrative is needed to generate consensus among key stakeholders – the Council, Secretariat, Member States, TCCs/PCCs etc. – on the purpose, nature and limits of peace operations. A reform process should:

- Define/refine/confirm the <u>core business</u> of peace operations as well as the future of the <u>basic peacekeeping principles.</u>
- Highlight harsh realities, in particular the <u>limits </u>of peace operations as well as the <u>true cost </u>of capable operations (and the dangers of "doing more with less").
- Make <u>success stories</u> public

New Thinking about Partners

New thinking is needed on partners: member states, TCCs/PCCs, regional organizations, host nations - or at least on those patterns that have emerged in identifying and interacting with partners that do not serve today's operational and political needs. Reform should address, for example:

- Forging a <u>common understanding</u> between Council, TCCs/PCCs and the missions <u>on critical mission tasks</u>. The implementation of PoC or a robust strategy must not be hampered by diverging interpretations of the mandate or operational approaches.
- Broadening the partnership beyond current TCCs/PCCs to those with <u>critical capabilities</u>, such as European nations.
- Relations with host-nation actors: this would include strategies for dealing with corruption in government just as much as forging <u>closer linkages with communities.</u> Actors beyond the governing elite are of growing importance given current challenges - be it PoC or countering non-state armed actors (including criminal/ terrorist groups).

Adapting to New Operational Environments

The most noticeable change in today's mission environments is a twofold one marked by the emergence of new types of <u>non-state armed actors</u> (organized crime/terrorism) and <u>the absence of stable peace agreements</u> ("no peace to keep"). Together this has led to more

missions operating in <u>non-permissive environments.</u> Key questions for a reform process include:

- What is required to quickly develop a <u>full and shared understanding of the challenge ahead</u>? What knowledge, technology and skill sets do missions require in order to understand new threats and to counter them?
- <u>How can peace operations be regionalized</u> in light of transnational threats – be it through regional political roadmaps, cross-border approaches to mandate implementation or inter-mission cooperation (including inter-organizational cooperation)?
- What are the implications for <u>staff security and duty of care</u>? Is there sufficient support for staff performing in circumstances such as those recently witnessed in South Sudan, Mali or Eastern Congo?

Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

Gender Mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming peacekeeping

Future reform efforts in UN peace operations should focus on 1) reengaging Western countries to encourage increased contributions 2) achieving a better balance of civilian, police and military contributions and 3) promoting gender mainstreaming in a meaningful manner.

The first of these relates to the overall future of the UN. In order to retain legitimacy, to shore up the institutions' exclusive ability to offer a truly international response to international issues, and to prevent further fracturing of effort, the UN must understand better how to reverse the decline in input from Western developed countries or risk being sidelined as the 'poorer' option for dealing with international peace and security issues. The Providing for Peacekeepers project provides a useful starting point for surveying rationales for (non) engagement but this needs to result in a comprehensive and workable engagement strategy.

In order to achieve the second and third priorities above, a rethinking of structures and priorities is needed. UNPKOs require a spectrum of responses. Ongoing de-siloisation between parts of the UN such as the UNDP and UNDPKO – a process already begun with initiatives such as the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections – should be accelerated to allow a more comprehensive and strategically-focused approach. More effort must go into generating civilian specialists and civilian police for UN deployments, and more space must be made at the planning table for such civilian input, indeed such planning frames may need to move away from military-sourced models. This would see the UN build on initiatives such as IOTs but new efforts must go further. Military options have remained the main go-to instrument and source of strategic planning despite the demands of operations changing. This issue also relates to gender mainstreaming.

In order to generate gender-sensitive responses to security problems, different mindsets to those generated by and through military or military-dominated institutions need to be brought the fore in order to help recognize and address gender-specific security concerns. An emphasis on increasing the ratio of women on missions, though important, has potentially obscured the contributions that could be made by a greater prioritization of local justice and development issues, for example. Advancing the 'gender agenda' is important. This agenda should be pursued as an end in itself, but the balancing of civilian and military contributions, as well as increased reengagement of Western states also further supports this particular aim.

Bethan Greener
Massey University, New Zealand

Gender Mainstreaming

Challenges of UN neutrality, importance of gender, and the politics of civil-military relations

Peace operation contexts are increasingly complex and volatile. Peace operations are necessarily civil-military in nature, where the ability to provide stability and security cannot be achieved by one actor alone. These operations have been characterized as "comprehensive", or "integrated approaches." Failures of these approaches have been addressed by attempts to refine technical issues of cooperation, etc. A core challenge however is the political nature of these operations themselves.

1. UN neutrality? Any comprehensive approach implies an overarching political agenda regarding how peace should be achieved, on what grounds, based on which values. We need to evaluate the reality of UN neutrality in light of the political agendas embodied in integrated approaches to peace operations.

2. Gender? The rhetoric of inclusion on the basis of gender needs to be better addressed in practice. Gender issues – not least ensuring the inclusion of women into all phases of peace processes, as well as recognizing the differing impacts of conflict based on gender – needs to go beyond token and technical initiatives of "add a woman" or "mention gender" (thus satisfying a gender "requirement). Claiming that gender impacts perceptions of security and integrating this in peace operations practice is a value-laden and political initiative. It values insights from men AND women, where women are equal contributors to peace operations. Own it!! Not least starting with the membership on the UN High-Level Panel.

3. Political operations? Much more work needs to go into what the civil-military interface implies within different contexts. Examine the implications of conflicts between the political nature of integrated approaches and the needs of humanitarian actors to be neutral and impartial, be explicit about what values are prioritized in these operations and why and who can or cannot contribute as a result. As one of the most powerful actors in the civil-military relationship (given their potential to use force), it is crucial that we ensure militaries increase their competencies in civil-military interaction to ensure better insight into the complexities of these relationships. Recent evidence suggests many militaries (particularly Western-based militaries) have the view that "we are all in this together" regarding the participation of all (including humanitarian) actors in an operation, or "we do our military (force) activity and keep out of the way of civilians". Neither approach is effective or satisfactory, and cause significant problems for any operationalization of peace operation strategies. Tactical and operational civil-military interaction needs more attention.

Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv
UiT The Arctic University of Norway

Accountability and Corruption

A Legal Framework for UN Peacekeeping

A main weakness of UN peacekeeping operations is the lack of an overarching legal framework. As a result, there are systemic weaknesses and gaps in the laws particularly relating to accountability. Peacekeeping operations are undermined by the different immunities and jurisdictional gaps that exist when peacekeeping personnel (troops and civilians) commit criminal acts.

The current legal position is that (i) troops are immune from host state jurisdiction, and (ii) civilian personnel are immune from the jurisdiction of any national court. The counterbalance for troops is that TCCs are under a duty to prosecute troops who commit crimes. The counterbalance for civilian personnel is the existence of a waiver. In practice those counterbalances are deployed only very rarely. That (a) undermines peacekeeping operations and (b) is in violation of victims' fundamental rights to access a court and a remedy.

The current laws have resulted in a culture of impunity. Personnel use the cloak of immunity to commit crimes knowing that they will not be held to account. Although the Zeid Report identified key reforms to address the culture of impunity surrounding sexual abuse, little has been done to implement those reforms. In order to strengthen peacekeeping operations' legitimacy and activities it is vital to revisit and address the issue of immunity and jurisdictional gaps.

Rather than tinkering around the edges of existing laws, it is time to explore a more concrete and viable alternative. To counterbalance immunities, the UN must consider creating courts to prosecute individuals who commit criminal acts. Those courts could be (i) internal to the UN, along the model of the UN employment tribunals, or (ii) attached to each peacekeeping operation, along the model of local claims commissions. The courts could be internationalized or hybrid. They would have jurisdiction over all peacekeeping personnel and would ensure accountability for criminal acts committed by peacekeepers, thus addressing the culture of impunity that undermines peacekeeping operations.

Rosa Freedman
Lecturer at Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham

Accountability and Corruption

Accountability for all those participating in peacekeeping missions

Improve accountability mechanisms for all personnel serving on peacekeeping missions. This should involve improved transparency, a review of national practice among countries contributing personnel (military, police and civilian) to peacekeeping missions. Make information relating to investigations and disciplinary action more accessible, including the creation of a data base on incidents/allegations and the response by the UN and contributing states. There is a need to institutionalize procedures and have a monitoring/reporting mechanism for follow up. Consider ways for keeping victims involved or at least informed of outcomes.

The goal should be a Unified Preventive, Investigative and Prosecution Process. Consider the establishment of a unified complaints procedure for victims and the creation of an Ombudsperson.

Command and Control

Command and control mechanisms of peacekeeping forces remain problematic. There is a need for greater coherency and more effective structures and mechanisms for all peacekeeping forces.

Rules of engagement

Insufficient attention is given to providing clear ROE distinguishing between Chapter VI and VII missions. These should be updated and adapted for each new operation established, giving particular attention to the threat assessment and parties to the conflict.

Training

Improve training and standards among all participating states – for both military and police personnel. This should include enhanced training in international humanitarian law and human rights law. The goal should be eliminate or reduce the disparity in standards between contingents and personnel from different contributing states.

Participation

There is a need to expand the pool of troop contributing states. These are currently dominated by states from the global South. Increased participation among states from the global North would enhance peacekeeping capacity and facilitate greater political engagement by those states.

Prof. Ray Murphy
Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland Galway, Galway, Ireland

Accountability and Corruption

Accountability and evaluation

This brief note contains a personal reflection regarding three important areas for potential reforms to UN peace operations. First, the accountability of UN peace operations should be strengthened. Over the past decade, the UN has recognized that accountability is crucial for ensuring that UN peace operations enjoy local legitimacy and maintain global credibility. However, despite many efforts and institutional changes, UN peace operations currently have insufficient responsibility safeguards. At present, UNMIK's Human Rights Advisory Panel serves as the most advanced field-based institutional mechanism, which is basically a quasi-judicial mechanism that provides non-binding opinions on eventual human rights abuses by UN personnel. So, one potential avenue for UN reforms is to install similar mechanisms in all UN peace operations and ensure that such mechanisms not only provide answers to allegations of human rights abuses but also go one step further and include more robust political and legal accountability measures.

Second, the evaluation of UN peace operations should include unintended consequences. Currently, the impact assessment of UN peace operations looks only to the immediate impact and performance assessment rather than examining the broader societal impact. This can be a misleading approach for understanding progress in post-conflict peace process as well as being a misguiding way of measuring the effectiveness of peace operations. Accordingly, a more realistic impact assessment should include unintended consequences of UN peace operations and develop better anticipatory mechanisms to prevent and mitigate them in the first place. Also, UN reporting should expand the nature of indicators for measuring peace by combining institutional indicators with broader societal indicators.

Third, the strengthening of local infrastructures for peace should be part of future UN peacebuilding operations. Infrastructure for peace involves various local institutional and informal mechanisms for peaceful dialogue, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding. Currently, the UN peacebuilding toolkit does not contain sufficient and explicit guidance on how to develop and support local infrastructure for peace, both part of national governments and civil society groups. Future peace operations should make mandatory the formation of formal and non-formal local mechanisms that support bottom-up, localized, and autonomous peace initiatives grounded on local culture, needs, and ownership. With sufficient political and financial support, the local infrastructure for peace could constitute an adequate balance between peacebuilding efforts focused on institutional reforms supplemented by localized peace processes on the ground.

Dr. Gëzim Visoka
Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction School of Law and
Government, Dublin City University

Accountability and Corruption

Corruption in peacekeeping

Peacekeeping missions are seriously affected by corruption. Conflict and post-conflict environments are difficult, and the fact that corruption is often endemic in mission areas immensely complicates the work of the UN, other international organizations, and post-conflict actors generally. Peacekeeping missions may have no option but to work with local actors known to be involved in corruption in order to help stabilize a particular region. Additionally, while peacekeeping missions are expected to behave with integrity themselves, they can exacerbate the problem if they "turn a blind eye" or are unwitting accomplices through being unaware of the threat posed by endemic corruption to the mission's ability to implement its mandate.

The likelihood of missing the significance of the threat is increased by the fact that little guidance exists and very little is done to train personnel before they deploy on mission, particularly troops and police who will come into daily contact with the population. Indeed, the complexities of international military operations, including peacekeeping, are poorly understood. In the 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, which assessed degrees of corruption risk, the average integrity score of international military operations across 82 countries was 28%; this is telling in terms of the lack of acknowledgement countries give to corruption as a strategic issue, institutionalize operational training, operational corruption monitoring, or control contracting while on operations.

While taking a position on endemic corruption may increase the complexity in the early stages of a mission, it will pay dividends in terms of institution building and stability in the long-term, as well as potentially speeding up the implementation of mandated tasks. This is particularly true in today's complex environments wherein corruption takes many forms and feeds into larger issues such as organized crime and terrorism financing. There is a need to ensure that peacekeeping missions have the necessary guidance and training to understand the multi-faceted ways in which corruption manifests itself in today's crisis situations and are equipped with the necessary tools to tackle it. This objective will only be realized if the need is recognized during the development of a peacekeeping mission's mandate.

Organizations such as Transparency International, the Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector, and U4 Anti-Corruption Research Centre are good resources on corruption-related research, and are making headway in anti-corruption initiatives and working with governments on areas for reform. These organizations have specialist expertise in addressing corruption and produce numerous corruption-related research and guidance documents that can be helpful for peacekeeping missions and the UN as a whole. One example is Transparency International-UK's International Defence and Security Programme's (TI-UK DSP's) "Corruption threats and

Accountability and Corruption

International Missions: Practical Guidance for Leaders," a recently published handbook for military and civilian leadership and their staff involved in planning and carrying out operations. The handbook identifies ten pathways which can enable and facilitate corruption in the mission environment and offers practical ways to mitigate corruption risks.

Moreover, using evidence drawn from many years of practical experience, TI-UK DSP's experts facilitate training and capacity building workshops and roundtables for defense officials, armed forces, police and civil society representatives around the world, including those that deploy to international missions. Working with partner organizations, TI-UK DSP's Building Integrity and Anti-Corruption (BI/AC) training courses have been successfully delivered to over 1000 participants from more than 26 countries. These courses would be immensely helpful to troops, police and civilians that deploy to peacekeeping missions, enabling them to identify the specific corruption risks that arise in crisis situations and learn effective ways of tackling them.

Transparency International UK
International Defence and Security Programme (TI-UK DSP)

Input from the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations Initiative

The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations Initiative has examined how the shift of power away from the West to a greater number of actors often referred to as emerging powers may influence the future of peace operations. The initiative aimed to gain a better understanding about the points of view of emerging powers and troop contributing countries (TCCs) by organizing regional dialogue meetings around the globe, and as a result obtaining a clearer picture about the future direction of peace operations. These are some of the main findings. The final report will be published and launched in New York early December 2014.

- Contrary to the popular assumption that increasing multi-polarity is detrimental to cooperation and consensus on peace operations, emerging powers have largely expressed a positive sentiment towards peace operations. Traditional and emerging powers have common interests in conflict management in many key regions, particularly in Africa.
- In the past few years, debates about peace operations have been riddled by misconceptions that have often led to a counter-productive and polluted exchange in policy circles. By focusing the discussion on the exceptional cases, discussions become unnecessarily polarized. In the long run that may lead to throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
- Many of the current operations require risk-taking, while only a limited number of contingents are able and willing to take these necessary risks. Acknowledging and dealing more openly with the risks that peace operations entail is vital.
- There is an unbalanced approach to burden sharing in peace operations and an oversimplification of what constitutes an equitable division of labor in the eyes of TCCs. The peace operations architecture would be healthier if the imbalance between FCCs and TCCs would be decreased.
- Regionalization will not be sufficient for meeting the future challenges for peace operations. There are few 'regional solutions to regional problems'. While more investment, respect and ownership for regional organizations are needed, one should not expect them to solve regional issues on their own.

- The norms and concepts in peace operations are generally not questioned, but the operationalization of some sometimes is. Therefore further agreement has to be reached on the modus operandi of in particular R2P, POC and robust operations.

Jaïr van der Lijn and Xenia Avezov,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
and Marius Müller-Hennig, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Small TCCs and small contingents; co-deployments

This contribution is not going to offer any suggestions on a political nor strategic level, instead it should be taken as an overview of thoughts and issues emphasized on the tactical level; that is by members of small contingents from small armed forces and small countries. Recent research reveals the following issues:

First, a lack of capacity for intercultural interaction among service members (and other personnel) working in field. We are not talking only about the cultural awareness directed towards the local environment (trained during the pre-deployment period), but also cross-cultural understanding between the service members (peacekeepers) of different nationalities. This has been on several occasions emphasised in relation to the peace operation's effectiveness. The cultural differences can be observed in the different approaches to work, roles of genders, sources of stress, level and type of cooperation, perception of burden sharing, etc. It should be mentioned though that joint pre-operational training and common military culture work as an integrating mechanism between service members of different nationalities.

Second, a level of risk aversion noted in public opinion polls. People are very much opposing the high risk related to some of the complex peace operations. In the case of Slovenia, the longitudinal research shows that combat operations with expected use of weapons receive very little support, while humanitarian grounds for peace operation are very appreciated and supported. It seems that the public is not opposing the role nor is it questioning the importance of the military in the peace process, but it would rather see a military providing peace and security with non-coercive means than with the traditional military approaches.

Third, more consideration needed for small countries. It seems to be very important to encourage small countries with armed forces corresponding to their size to define their niches – expertize or national advantages where they can contribute despite the limitations (e.g. human resources, economic means, etc.). Perhaps they should also be encouraged to engage more intensively in their region and to systematically establish long-term cooperation with a country that can provide logistic support.

Fourth, the stress caused by personal issues (family/children). There is a lack of attention focused on the role of the family and the influence the deployment has on children of deployed personnel. It shouldn't be forgotten that the families of deployed personnel can easily become "victims" if not treated properly.

Janja Vuga, PhD
Assistant Professor at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

Global South TCCs; Arms embargos; Protection of Civilians

1. *Making use of the full potential of TCC experience from the global South[7]:*

a) tapping into Southern domestic development experience, especially inequality/poverty reduction and anti-corruption measures, as a means to address conflicts' root causes, making substantive contributions possible without requiring direct participation in robust Ch. VII action;

b) active, sustained support for recruitment and training of police and civilian personnel in Southern states (specifically including women). Extensive sharing of knowledge is required, and recruitment and training costs are presently often borne by (poorly remunerated) candidates themselves. This includes a bidirectional learning process on gender policies;

c) more active pursuit of partnerships with regional arrangements beyond AU and NATO, including for extra-regional deployments.

2. *Renewed attention to the role of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the conflict cycle:*

a) renewed attention to effective enforcement of arms embargos to conflict regions, in accordance with the extensive formal measures already in place, such as marking/tracing and provisions of the ATT. This includes supply-side sanctions such as naming and shaming of producers whose weapons are in widespread illicit use in a conflict zone;

b) increased and concerted discursive and material UN support for the prevention of small arms proliferation in areas considered at risk for violent conflict, before the outbreak of open hostilities.

3. *Clear guidelines for the implementation of PoC/R2P principles*

a) systematic and consistent inclusion of PoC and a widely accepted minimum definition of R2P in PKO mandates, where appropriate and applicable according to UN guidelines;

b) establishment of a clear operational distinction between PoC and R2P at the tactical level;

c) concession of sufficient autonomy for field commanders to implement PoC measures in emergency situations.

Prof. Dr. Kai Michael Kenkel
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro

---

[7] There is an important feedback process here of UN experience into national contexts, in terms of strengthening public-sector capacity including law enforcement.

Other Issues

New Technology in UN Peace Operations

New technology can be seen as both an advantage and a challenge to the UN. Surveillance drones and commercial satellite image providers are increasingly an important source of information for UN peace operations. They can provide up-to-date images at low cost. New tools require new capacities – e.g. analysis capacity is crucial. It is not a layman task to analyze satellite pictures and synthetic aperture radar data.

Community Alert Networks (CANs), exemplified in the DRC, can alert the UN when a situation is emerging and enable real-time monitoring of evolving issues. This improves the ability of a mission to capture, understand, and integrate local perceptions into daily decision-making.

Google, Microsoft and other tech giants can help the UN in getting a grip on how to sort through the vast piles of data it gathers in more effective ways. Digital "exhaust" can be useful to detect macro trends – group geotagging of mobile phones to detect population movement, use sudden spikes of remittances to detect geographical locations where tension is looming – and the Secretary-General should find ways for the banking, telecoms, and remittances industries to share their data without revealing business secrets. More direct cooperation with the private sector is needed – the engagement of Facebook with the humanitarian sector can serve as one possible example.

Consent and the host population risk being treated as second rate citizens – it may be implicitly assumed that the need to give consent is a luxury good that does not apply in situations of crisis. Using crowdsourced information can have unintended and negative consequences through group or individual re-identification when combined with other information (known as the Mosaic-effect), putting civilians in danger of persecution, torture, or death by hostile actors.

There is also a real danger that technology will speed up the tendency of troops, civilians, and humanitarians retreating to the safe walls of their compounds. Increased knowledge creates increased responsibility. The UN should resist "bunkerization" of UN peace operations and use technology and innovation to enable peace operations to match the increased knowledge that technology can give with increased mobility and agility, and the requisite will to implement their mandates. In the calls for more and better technology there is an inherent danger of distancing ourselves from those we intend to help, and shifting accountability from helpers to receivers.

John Karlsrud
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Other Issues

Accountability, information management, and mission management

1. Collecting, managing, integrating, assessing, presenting, and acting upon Information

   <u>Discussion</u>:

   A continuing theme from all of the after action reviews of UN missions is the inability for them to gain a common picture of themselves and the operational environment. This inhibits their ability not only to accomplish the mandate but also to manage themselves.

   The UN is not using all technology and approaches available. There are numerous sources of information arriving at the country team, mission headquarters, and New York that needs to be sorted and understood.

   Modern systems are not universally in place or used properly, individuals with proper training and expertise are not available, procedures used to collect, fuse, and share all sources need to be examined, and the proper use of this information to inform decision makers at all levels must be addressed.

2. Holding the members of the UN peacekeeping mission accountable for operational performance

   <u>Discussion</u>:

   Many reports show that various units, elements, and sections of UN missions have failed to accomplish the tasks set out, yet they have not been held accountable. The latest report on Protection of Civilians by the OIOS is an example. Units are held more accountable for the condition of the equipment than for their performance.

   Conduct has been a significant problem as well and the UN bureaucracy has been slow to respond. There is a lack of willingness among TCCs and PCCs and the civilian side to address these issues and this leads to a poor reputation not just with the host nation but also with the wider community undermining legitimacy of the mission.

3. Managing Operations

   <u>Discussion</u>:

   Structure and resourcing at UN headquarters and in the field struggles to manage integrated missions. Stove piping still inhibits integration as UN functions at headquarters in New York move with different agendas and at a different pace that what is needed in the operational area.

Other Issues

Staff functioning in UN missions among the elements has been uneven. There is no holistic education, training, and evaluation system for staff augmentation to UN missions.

The UN has been experimenting with various solutions and arrangements to meet emerging requirements, such as the Force Intervention Brigade in the Congo, French and UN troops in Mali and CAR, AMISOM in Somalia, the hybrid mission in Sudan, and others. This has been done with no doctrine and no policy and therefore has not been institutionalized.

Sudan has had several missions running simultaneously. Who has the political lead for these complex missions when there is not a clear UN lead? The expansion of the range of actors engaged is a positive development, but having multiple high-level envoys and several multilateral organizations, donors, local leaders all with a stake in the process and operational presences on the ground, can create confusion about who actually sets the strategy and makes key decisions?

Relationships among, NATO, EU, AU and other regional and sub-regional organizations is still ad hoc and has not been codified to include the educational and training component.

Bill Flavin
US Army War College

Other Issues

The Francophone dimension of peace operations

For the past 15 years, large parts of the Francophone space (West and Central Africa, Haiti, Lebanon) have been marred with instability. As of September 30 2014, following the creation of MINUSCA, over 60% of the peacekeepers deployed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations were located in Francophone countries. This situation causes various challenges that were underlined on October 9th by France's Permanent Representative to the United Nations during the Security Council debate on peacekeeping operations.

Ambassador Delattre rightly pointed out that the human factor should never be neglected in peace operations: "Missions must be adapted to the local context and be capable of building close ties with the people they are meant to protect. The use of French should be fully taken into account, and I wish to recall that we need to have more French speakers in peacekeeping operations deployed in French-speaking areas at all levels, from rank-and-file soldiers to Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as well as in New York. This is a powerful factor in operational efficiency."

The Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations (ROP) is convinced that a special effort should be undertaken by the United Nations to meet the needs of the missions deployed in French-speaking areas. For their part, French-speaking countries must improve their contribution to peace operations by providing more personnel and by supplying them adequately with the equipment, skills and language competences required to efficiently operate in a multinational environment. This is all the more important that in the short term the introduction of new technologies in peace operations will require specific training for their use.

Jocelyn Coulon
Director
Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations (ROP), Université de Montréal

Michel Liégeois
Director, ROP-Europe, Université catholique de Louvain

Une dimension francophone

Depuis une quinzaine d'année, l'espace francophone (Afrique, Haïti, Liban) est marqué par l'instabilité. En date du 30 septembre 2014, avec la création de la MINUSCA en Centrafrique, plus de 60% des casques bleus déployés par le département des opérations de paix de l'ONU l'étaient dans des pays francophones Cette situation n'est pas sans poser certains problèmes comme l'a d'ailleurs rappelé l'ambassadeur de France lors du débat sur les opérations de maintien de la paix tenu le 9 octobre dernier au Conseil de sécurité.

L'ambassadeur rappelait, avec raison, que l'aspect humain ne doit jamais être négligé dans les opérations de maintien de la paix. « Les missions doivent s'adapter aux contextes locaux et être

capables de tisser des liens étroits avec les populations que nous devons protéger. La francophonie doit être pleinement prise en compte, et je voudrais rappeler encore que nous avons besoin de plus de francophones, à tous les niveaux, de l'homme de troupe au représentant spécial du Secrétaire général, ainsi qu'à New York. »

Le Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix est convaincu qu'un effort particulier doit être entrepris par l'ONU pour répondre aux besoins exprimés par les missions en territoires francophones. De leur côté, les États francophones doivent améliorer leurs contributions aux opérations de paix en fournissant plus de personnel doté de l'équipement, des compétences et des connaissances linguistiques requises pour opérer dans un environnement multinational. Et cela est d'autant plus important que l'introduction de technologie de pointe au service des Casques bleus va demander des formations spécifiques pour leur utilisation.

Jocelyn Coulon
Directeur
Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP)

Michel Liégois
Directeur, ROP-Europe

Other Issues

Institutionalizing harmonized approaches: the importance of UN policy-making frameworks[8]

The state of peacekeeping policymaking at the UN can be visualized as three cogs:

1) Longer term policy – the slowest of the cogs in the UN system, as it involves the widest array of actors and policy issues. Included here is the C34 process, the development of structural changes in the DPKO/DFS, and doctrinal developments (such as the 'principles and guidelines' and New Horizons Process). The fruits of this process often have to find agreement of a wider range of member states, as well as operationalization by the Secretariat.

2) Operational demands –These refer to responses to threats taking the form of mandates for peacekeeping operations through the Security Council and Secretariat, from the surge in operations at the beginning and end of the 1990s to current developments in Mali, South Sudan, the CAR, and DRC. Such operations have considerable ramifications for what we have traditionally come to know as 'peacekeeping.'

3) "Shocks" – these come in the form of often-avoidable events which shake up peacekeeping practice. For instance: The killing of US servicemen in Somalia in 1992, the Rwandan Genocide, the massacre in Srebrenica, the sexual exploitation and abuse scandals in the early 2000s, and the possible ramifications from the Cholera outbreak in Haiti. At times these shocks happen due to significant failures at a tactical level. However, sometimes they come about as a result of urgent operational demands working on a different timeline than longer-term policy developments. Current peacekeeping operations have seen operational demands which have significantly challenged the core principles of peacekeeping – the impartiality of a deployed peacekeeping force, the need for strategic consent from the host state, and changes regarding the minimum use of force (apart from self-defense and the defense of the mandate). There is at times a clear contrast between operational developments – most clearly seen in the Security Council – and deliberations related to longer-term planning — seen through statements from the C34 in which member states consistently refer back to the prominence of core principles. This is as much to do with the 'changing nature of conflict' as it is to do with decision-making frameworks in UNHQ. Thus a review of peacekeeping operations needs to examine how policy is formulated in the Security Council, C34, and Secretariat. This should cover the process of mandate formulation, triangular cooperation, the C34 process, and incorporation of lessons learned from previous operations. Without such a review, the UN's peacekeeping architecture will be susceptible to further shocks.

Dr. David Curran
Research Fellow: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, Centre for Trust, Peace, and Social Relations
Coventry University

---

[8] The recommendations are based on my experiences of observing UN policy-making at UNHQ in 2013-14, whilst undertaking a Peacekeeping Research Fellowship with the organization 'Global Action to Prevent War'.

Other Issues

Security Sector Reform, an integrating function or a separate discipline?

Security Sector Reform is increasingly perceived as the answer to the vast array of security challenges that beset post-conflict and fragile communities. It is hyped as the answer to the exit strategy dilemma faced by the international community. It is not the concept of SSR that matters, but the integrated approach it brings to police reform, defense reform, justice reform, governance reform, and national security planning. It can also be the bridge that conceptually links the security-development nexus.

SSR has always been about four relatively simple assertions, it was about[9]

> 1) Taking a human security approach – focus not only on state security but also on how an individual experiences insecurity and accesses justice. Treat security and justice as public policy issues.
> 2) Recognising that security and justice reform in all contexts is first and foremost a political process rather than solely a technical activity.
> 3) Re-balancing support to both the effectiveness <u>and</u> the accountability of security and justice services. Hard but valuable lessons have been learned about the consequences of increasing the effectiveness of security actors without ensuring adequate accountability.
> 4) Recognizing the inter-linkages across the security and justice sector—the reform of the police, for example, is not only about the police force but also those other actors who have policing functions, as well as those who manage and oversee policing services.

Police reform, justice reform, governance reform, and national security planning have long been part and parcel of how national governments have functioned. SSR is not a new discipline; it is merely a new approach to activities that have become siloed, overly technical, disconnected and lacking accountability.

Rather than being about integrating these simple principles into on-going work, SSR is now recognized by some as a separate all-encompassing discipline, the panacea for all the challenges faced by post-conflict or fragile states. This trend to see SSR as a separate discipline, rather than something that plays an integrating function adds a level of complexity to SSR that

---

[9] These four pillars of SSR can be seen in all of the key policy documents on SSR including the SC resolution 2151, UN Secretary-General's report "Securing Peace and Development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform" (2008), the AU Policy Framework on SSR in 2013; the EU Concept on SSR (2005); and the OECD DAC Handbook on SSR (2007).

Other Issues

was never intended and hampers the ability of SSR to influence and work with others already engaging on issues ranging from police reform to parliamentary oversight.

There is equally a need for a discussion on how the UN is approaching SSR. There are in-effect two questions here; the first is where UN peacekeeping missions can best target their assistance, at the strategic or programmatic levels. While the second issue is whether SSR is viewed as a separate discipline or whether it plays an integrating function.

Within the UN there appears to be a number of different structures developing within peacekeeping and political missions. In Liberia, the SSR advisor is part of the SRSG's office, underlining the political nature of SSR and the role that an SSR advisor/unit can play in supporting the SRSG in these political-level discussions. Also by being within the SRSG's office, the SSR advisor can work across the mission more effectively, ensuring linkages between sectors, whilst also providing advice to the likes of the Police Component, Military or Civilian Component on issues of governance, and the political process around the reforms.

Let's call it an 'SSR approach to police reform', for example, but what is important regarding SSR is the application of the key principles into how we tackle security and justice issue: recognising the political nature of reform, the need to balance effectiveness with governance, the need to recognise the inter-linked nature of the system, and that people should be at the core of all reforms.

DCAF's International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT)

Other Issues

Human Rights in Peacekeeping

Here are several ideas for the peace operations review panel.

1. Make human rights a more prominent focus of policy, operations, and advocacy. Since most conflicts arise from severe and systematic human rights violations, preventing further violations while supporting efforts to rectify past violations is central to the work undertaken by the UN. This has several ramifications.

2. Senior mission leadership must be highly familiar and comfortable with human rights issues. Leadership must not shy away from raising these issues in the right way at the right time. Public vs. private interventions, proposing solutions while simultaneously not backing down from raising negative assessments should be part of peace operations' strategy.

3. Mission leaders should not identify "human rights" only with civil and political freedoms or only with adversarial confrontations – so-called "naming and shaming." Rather, human rights analyses, programs, and public statements should include economic, social, and cultural rights and programs addressing the state's performance.

4. The rights to food, shelter, education, health care, and clean water are frequently violated in most countries where the UN sends peace operations. These violations often target ethnic, religious, racial or other minorities. These excluded groups unsurprisingly resent this discrimination and the resulting marginalization.

5. UN peace operations, working closely with UN Country Team agencies, should focus on development projects that will respond to these violations. UN agencies have the budget and the country knowledge but often lack the political clout to implement such programming which must include state accountability for achieving measurable improvements.

6. So Mission leaders should support efforts to tackle the deep-rooted causes of the conflict. Results will take time, and planning for hand-offs from the Peace Operation to the UNCT is required from the outset.

7. Mission leaders should make clear to the government and the population that achieving economic, social, and cultural rights is a process where progress must be achieved and the UN is there to help realize this progress in collaboration with the state and civil society.

8. Peace Operations should embrace the OROLSI Rule of Law Indicators and use the most appropriate ones to gauge progress or lack thereof. The UN cannot constantly preach that states must be accountable and insure adequate oversight yet exempt itself from these dicta. The Indicators assess the impact of projects on police, judicial, and prison reform which in turn can spotlight progress or why reform is not occurring.

9. Indicators help the operation determine when it is time to draw down or withdraw. These are concrete, measurable over time changes that illustrate when the core institutions responsible for public safety and security and the peaceful resolution of disputes function to

an extent that renders the UN superfluous. Picking the wrong indicators, which has happened in Haiti, Timor Leste, and elsewhere, has lead to premature withdrawal.

William G. O'Neill
Director
Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum

Index